Middle East Perspectives by Rick Francona

October 6 - Celebrating the "Victories" of the 1973 War

2026-10-06T14:58:59.258-07:00

Photos: On top is the banner of the news outlet Al-Ahram touting special coverage of "The Glorious October Victory." On the lower left is a monument at the spot where Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal. On the lower right, a monument to the Egyptian soldiers lost in the war.

October 6 is Armed Forces Day in Egypt, this year celebrating the 53rd anniversary of the "victory" in the 1973 war, which is often called the Yom Kippur War, named for the Jewish holiday. Syria had celebrated October 6 as Tishreen Liberation War Day, but after the fall of the Bashar al-Asad regime and the end of the al-Asads' rule, the holiday was terminated by the new government.

Both Egypt and Syria believe they were victorious in this war, which is patently absurd. Yes, they both were initially successful on October 6 in surpring the Israelis. The Egyptians were able to cross the Suez Canal into the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula and break the Israeli Bar-Lev defense line. The Syrians were able to get to the top of the Golan Heights. Israeli forces retreated a short distance on both fronts.

These "victories" were short-lived. The Israelis stopped the advances on both fronts, called up the reserves, and - thanks to a massive U.S. airlift and equipment transfers - counterattacked on both fronts.

When the fighting stopped, the Israelis had completely encircled the Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai, crossed the Suez Canal, and were on the highway to Cairo, stopping at Kilometer 101.

On the northern front, Israeli forces retook the entire Golan Heights and moved up along the road to Damascus. They stopped at the town of Sa'sa', just 28 miles from the capital, basically within artillery range.

The fighting stopped on October 24, with the United Nations Disengagement of Forces (UNDOF) agreement taking effect the next day. The UNDOF lines in Syria held until the end of the al-Asad rule, at which point Israeli forces re-entered southern Syria. Their remaning presence is an issue that is impeding a security agreement between Israel and the new Syrian government.

On the Egyptian front, Israeli forces pulled back to the Sinai. However, unlike with Syria, Egypt and Israel eventually reached a deal by which Israel agreed to a phased withdrawal in return for a peace treaty with Egypt. It was formally signed in 1979.

All that said, for Egypt and Syria to claim victory is, as I said, absurd. On both fronts, the Israelis soon regained the initiative and moved towards Damascus and Cairo, plus surrounding and rendering useless an entire Egyptian field army.

That's not victory. Egypt and Syria each won a battle, then lost the war.
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PS - See my photographs of the Suez Canal and Suez Canal Military

The Bowe Bergdahl Saga – Is It Finally Over?

2026-09-04T00:00:14.800-07:00

Bowe Bergdahl’s 2017 desertion and misbehavior before the enemy conviction has been reinstated by a federal court. The court ruled – correctly in my non-lawyer opinion – that a district court judge does not have the authority to interfere in any way with the military justice system. Let’s review this case.

On the night of June 29-30, 2009, U.S. Army Private First Class Bowe Bergdahl deserted his post at Observation Post Mest in Paktika Province, Afghanistan. Bergdahl was assigned as an infantryman to the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. He had enlisted in the Army in 2008.

Bergdahl was captured relatively soon after deserting his post. The exact date is unknown; however, the Taliban released a video of Bergdahl in captivity on July 18, 2009. This began his five years of captivity by the Haqqani network under extremely harsh conditions.

In May of 2014, in a colossal lapse of judgment, the Obama administration agreed to release five extremely dangerous and notorious senior Taliban leaders from the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo, Cuba in exchange for Bergdahl’s release.

On May 31, 2014, Bergdahl was released to a U.S. special operations team at a helicopter landing zone in Afghanistan. The “Taliban Five” were transported to Qatar who had agreed to hold them and restrict their travel. Chalk up another failure for the Obama team – the "Taliban Five" later all became involved again in operations in Afghanistan.

Following an investigation to confirm what virtually everyone already knew – on March 25, 2015, the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces Command authorized charges to be brought against Bergdahl under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ):

- Article 85 — Desertion with intent to shirk important or hazardous duty

- Article 99 — Misbehavior before the enemy

The charges were referred to a military court for an Article 32 preliminary hearing.

It was noted in the charges that several U.S. troops were injured in attempts to locate Bergdahl after his initial disappearence/desertion. Members of his unit believe that other soldiers lost their lives in these searches.

For those of us who have served in combat zones, these two articles are considered to be as bad as it gets. Desertion (Article 85) is extremely serious and potentially punishable by death if committed in time of war. We can argue over the question of whether Afghanistan was a war or not. This was one of the Obama Administration talking points as several officials and supportive media attempted to downplay Bergdahl’s desertion. At one point, Obama's National Security Advisor Susan Rice declared that Bergdahl "served the United States with honor and distinction." Nothing could be further from the truth.

However, the charge of “misbehavior before the enemy” (Article 99) is the big one. It is explicitly punishable by death or another punishment directed by a court-martial.

In September 2015, the Article 32 preliminary hearing was convened. There were attempts by some in the Obama Administration to downgrade this into a lower-level special court-martial, but in the end, the Army stuck to their guns (no pun intended) and referred the charges to the highest level, a general court-martial. Bergdahl was arraigned at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on December 22, 2015.

In December 2016, Bergdahl asked President Obama for a pre-emptive pardon ahead of his trial. To his credit, in a rare moment of moral clarity, Obama did not do so.

On October 16, 2017, Bergdahl voluntarily pleaded guilty without a plea bargain and opted for a military judge only trial. Probably a smart move – presenting these serious charges to a full general court-martial panel in the face of overwhelming inculpatory evidence likely would have resulted in a harsher sentence.*

On November 3, 2017, the military judge sentenced Bergdahl to a dishonorable discharge, reduction in rank to Private (E-1), and forfeiture of pay, but no prison time, despite prosecutors seeking 14 years of incarceration. I agreed with the judge's decision to not impose prison time.

After his sentencing, the military appellate system kicked in. These are serious charges, with a serious sentence – a dishonorable discharge from the armed forces carries serious consequences.

- July 16, 2019 — Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA): Affirmed Bergdahl's conviction and sentence.

- August 27, 2020 — Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF): Affirmed the ACCA decision, upholding the conviction.

- February 2, 2021 — Final military appeal: CAAF denied Bergdahl's writ-appeal petition, exhausting his military appellate remedies.

On February 17, 2021, Berdahl’s lawyers filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking the court to review the military justice proceedings and declare that Bergdahl's conviction was unconstitutional and should be vacated.

On July 25, 2023, a U.S. District Judge in that court vacated Bergdahl's conviction on procedural grounds.

On September 1, 2026, the D.C. Circuit struck down that decision because a federal district court lacks authority to vacate a court-martial conviction. The court ordered Bergdahl's lawsuit dismissed, leaving his original military conviction in effect. His dishonorable discharge was effectively reinstated.

Eugene R. Fidell, Berdahl’s very capable and experienced attorney said the case is about “the integrity of the military justice system,” and added that “there is a grave command influence problem that has pervaded this case from the very beginning.” Fidell’s team has 45 days to weigh several options for challenging the ruling, including asking the same panel to reconsider or seeking a discretionary review by the Supreme Court.

My take: Give it up, Fidell. The guy is a confessed deserter. He pleaded guilty to that and, even worse, misbehavior before the enemy. He got what he deserved. The prosecution wanted 14 years of incarceration at the U.S. Military Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I was among those who supported the dishoorable discharge and the non-custodial sentence. His five years at the hands of the Taliban were enough punishment, albeit self-induced. It’s over – move on.

ADDENDUM: When Bergdahl was returned to American control, I was a military analyst for CNN. As such, I was interviewed extensively about this case, and wrote several articles detailing my personal views and analysis (see links below). I stand by every word.

The Bowe Bergdahl exchange - a mixed blessing (June 1, 2014)

Military chiefs support the release of the "Taliban Five" for Sergeant Bergdahl - well, sort of.... (July 12, 2014)

The Bergdahl court-martial recommendation - has someone leaned on the Army? (October 12, 2015)

Bergdahl - the Army does the right thing (March 25, 2015)

Bergdahl - the deflective media campaign begins (March 28, 2015)

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* Personal note: Shortly after I was commissioned, I was selected to be a member of a general court-martial panel. I was ordered to present myself to the military judge (in this case, a USAF colonel). The defense counsel took one look at me, called for a pre-emptory challenge, and asked that I be excused. I was dismissed without saying a word, no explanation other than, “Thank you, Lieutenant, you are excused.”

I asked a mentor, a USAF colonel, what happened. He asked about the case. A staff sergeant had killed his five-year old son in base housing and was being charged with murder. The local police in Denver, Colorado, wanted no part of it – let the Air Force figure it out.

The colonel explained: "You showed up as required in full service dress ('dress blues') which requires all awards, decorations, and badges to be worn. The defense counsel, also a USAF officer, read your ribbons – he saw a prior service NCO, aircrew wings, nine Air Medals, Vietnam campaign medals – you are the last person he wants judging his NCO client. “

The Islamic Society of Monterey County and the Defense Language Institute

2026-08-23T22:54:33.621-07:00

Al-Taqwa Mosque, Seaside, California

On a quiet sidestreet in the city of Seaside, California sits a unobtrusive building with a sign in Arabic and English identifying it as the Masjid al-Taqwa (al-Taqwa Mosque) of the Islamic Society of Monterey County.* You may ask yourself, "Why is there a mosque on the Monterey Peninsula?"

The answer to that question involves one of the peninsula's major employers and landholders - the U.S. Army Presidio of Monterey, home of the Defense Language Institute (DLI). DLI is one of the largest and most respected language schools in the country. It trains thousands of members of the U.S. armed forces in dozens of languages used in intelligence, security assistance, diplomatic and exchange positions worldwide.

DLI has been at the Presidio since 1963 - it's predeccesor, the Army Language School began its instruction there in 1947. In 1963, the Department of Defense consolidated all military foreign language training as DLI.

The requirements for native speakers of dozens of foreign languages to become faculty members drew people from around the world, people of different ethinc and cultural backgrounds, including different religions. It should come as no surprise that many of the new faculty were Muslims - Islam is the second largest religion in the world, closely following Christianity.

I was a student at DLI several times: first at Biggs Field, Texas, for Vietnamese-Hanoi during the war in Southeast Asia, then at the Presidio for basic and intermediate Arabic, and later as an Arabic instructor. During those years, I saw changes in the demographic makeup of the Arabic language deparment's faculty.

In my first encounter as a student in 1973-74, most of the instructors were from Iraq and Egypt, with a smattering of Lebanese and Jordanians, and smaller numbers of Palestinians and Syrians, but very few Gulf Arabs.** An inordinate number of these intructors were Christians, much more than the demographics of the Middle East would indicate.

On my second tour as a student a few years later and during my tenure as a faculty member, I did notice a change in the makeup of the faculty. I have been back to speak to the Arabic students over the years, and I think my assessment is still accurate. What I see now is a much broader representation of the Arabic-speaking countries and a decided shift in the religions of the faculty. It appears to be mostly Muslims now.

Unfortunately, this developed into an issue during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm - the U.S. defense of Saudi Arabia and the liberations of Kuwait, respectively. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1991, some - albeit a small minority - took umbrage at the "rallying around the flag" not just in the country, but on the Presidio as well.

When asked about it, I had little sympathy for the position of the instructors who claimed to be offended. My comment: "This is a U.S. military facility, training American warriors to execute U.S. foreign policy. If that means military action against your country of origin, so be it. If it offends you, find another place to work." Again, I stress that this was a small minority.

There were similar reactions after the al-Qa'idah attacks of September 11, 2001. That tragedy was of such magnitude that even if people were offended by the U.S. response, they knew better than to raise it. I am curious, but do not know, the reaction to the Hamas attacks on Israelis on October 7, 2023.

So, what does this have to do with the Islamic Society of the Monterey Peninsula and its al-Taqwa (pronounced ah-TAQ-wa - the L is silent here***) Mosque? It means "the mosque of piety."

No great mystery. As native speakers took positions as instructors of the many languages being taught at DLI, faculty members came from many Muslim countries, not just Arabic-speaking countries, but countries such as Indonesia (the largest Muslim population in the world), Pakistan, India, Iran, Turkey, Albania, Afghanistan, etc.

At that time, there were no existing Muslim houses of worship in the area. A group of Muslim faculty members began meeting in their homes, finally forming the organization now known as the Islamic Society of Monterey County. To the point that it's not always about Arabic-speaking people, one of the founders of the society was an Indonesian, brought in to start the Indonesian and Malay department at the language school. The society began in 1965 and became a nonprofit religious corporation in 1969.

Following the attacks of 9/11, I also noticed an increase in what I would call the "Islamic leanings" of some of the faculty, many of whom I considered close friends - I still do, but the relationship has certainly changed. It is no longer possible to discuss Middle East events with some of them who become almost enraged when speaking about U.S. foreign policy. It's better left alone. I am often tempted to repeat the comments I made after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (see above).

So, in a way, the creation of the Defense Language Insititute at the Presidio of Monterey logically resulted in the creation of the Islamic Society of the Monterey County. It remains a key source of membership in the congregation.

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* There is another mosque in Monterey County - the Salinas Masjid of the Islamic Community of Salinas. The two groups are not affiliated, but often conduct programs, events, and celebrations with each other.

** I am speaking anectdotally here, based on my observations.

*** In Arabic, half of the letters are "solar" and half are "lunar" - solar letters drop the L in the definite article "al-" and double the next (solar) letter.

Syria Reasserts Sovereignty Over Russian Bases

2026-08-09T16:13:15.342-07:00

Russian Air Force Su-25 attack jets at Humaymim

On August 9, the Syrian Foreign Ministry announced that Damascus and Moscow have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) addressing the future of Russia's two military facilities in Syria: the naval facility at Tartus and the air base at Humaymim (colocated with Latakia International Airport).

The MOU comes after negotiations between the Russians and the new government of Syria following the removal of the Bashar al-Asad regime in December 2024.

Tartus has been used by Russian Navy ships for over 50 years. In 1971, Syria and the Soviet Union had signed an agreement to establish a Soviet naval logistics and support facility at the port. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the base remained open for use by the Russian Navy.

In 2015, the Bashar al-Asad government requested Russian military assistance to help in the fight against anti-government groups and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The logisitics facility at Tartus then developed into a semi-permanent Russian naval presence. At the same time, the Russian Air Force deployed combat and support aircraft to Humaymim air base and established a logistics air bridge between Russia and the Syrian base.

In 2017, Russia secured renewable 49-year leases for both the naval facility at Tartus and the air base at Humaymim. These facilities became Russian exclusion areas.

The Russians made extensive improvements to the air base to handle the expanded air force presence - runways extended, new taxiways and parking aprons, aircraft maintenance hangars, administrative buildings, and barracks built, as well as delployment of a state-of-the-art air defense and electronic warfare systems.

After the fall of the al-Asad government in December 2024, Russia withdrew its ships from the port at Tartus. It was not until the spring of 2026 that Russian Navy ships returned for a short time. While they continue to have access, there is not a restored permanent presence.

Today's agreement replaces the 49-year leases on both the naval facility and the air base. The key points of the MOU:

The Syrian Ministry of Defense will gradually take over the administration of the air base at Humaymim and the commercial pier at the port of Tartus.
The transfer will be completed and the new arrangements will take effect in three months.
The Syria Civil Aviation Authority will take over the Latakia International Airport and begin its rehabilitation.
The military facilities at Humaymim and Tartus will be transformed into joint Russian-Syrian training and qualification centers.

Russia's loss of the Syrian bases has forced them to seek alternative bases for its presence in the Mediterranean. Although they can still use Humaymim air base as a staging area for their operations in the Middle East and Africa, Libya is now being used more and more - Russia has access to as many as six air bases in the country.

As Syria attempts to reconstitute its armed forces, it is increasingly turning to Turkey for assistance and training. What remains to be seen is where the Ahmad al-Shara' government will seek to acquire new weapons, including aircraft and air defenses. While it would be preferable to wean the Syrians off Russian equipment, I am not sure Western governments will be willing to supply Damascus with sophisticated weaponry.

الله أكبر - "Allahu Akbar" - a Pronunciation Guide to the Takbir

2026-07-28T17:24:16.026-07:00

Allahu Akbar

The takbir - the Arabic phrase Allahu akbar ("God is greatest" or "God is greater") - is one of the best-known expressions in Islam. It has been used for nearly fourteen centuries in daily prayer, religious observance, and, historically, as a battlefield cry by Muslim armies. In recent decades it has also become associated in the public mind with Islamist terrorism because it is frequently shouted during attacks.

The phrase is frequently mispronounced in English-language media. Even experienced speakers occasionally omit the final 'u' in Allahu, pronouncing it as Allah akbar instead of the grammatically correct Allahu akbar.

The takbir appears on the national flags of two countries* - Iraq and Iran.

On the Iraqi flag (left), the takbir is the green script in the white stripe. The takbir was added to Iraq's flag in January 1991 just days before the beginning of the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein sought to portray the conflict as a jihad against the U.S.-led coalition.

On the Iranian flag (right), the takbir in white stylized script appears 22 times in the green and white stripes.

My guide to pronouncing the takbir: a-LAH-hu AK-bar.

International Phonetics: ʔaɫ.ɫaː.hu ʔak.ba

Listen to a native speaker.

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*

Saudi Arabia's flag does not contain the takbir. Instead, it bears the shahadah: "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is His messenger."

Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part Two)

2026-07-27T08:09:38.457-07:00

KC-135T of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard's 147th Air Refueling Squadron (Pittsburgh) refuels an F-15C of the 71st Fighter Squadron (Langley AFB)

Note: This should be read in conjunction with Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part One). As with that part, Part Two will feature graphics from one of my cruise lectures.

Flying boom refueling - Probe-and-drogue refueling

In this part, we will examine the two methods of aerial refueling, the advantages and disadvantages of each, and how they affect military operations.

Fortunately, the U.S. Air Force KC-46A Pegasus is equipped to conduct both flying boom and probe-and-drogue refueling, making it compatible with virtually every U.S. military fixed-wing aircraft requiring aerial refueling.

Flying boom refueling is favored by the Air Force. It's principal advantage is a much higher fuel transfer rate than the probe-and-drogue refueling.

The flying boom can transfer about three to four times the rate of a typical probe-and-drogue system. While this provides little advantage when refueling fighters, whose fuel systems cannot accept fuel at the boom's maximum rate, it is invaluable for large aircraft such as bombers, transports, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), maritime patrol aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft, all of which may need to take on tens of thousands of pounds of fuel during a single refueling.

At one point in my career, I was assigned to an RC-135 unit. We routinely flew missions lasting up to 20 hours - and occasionally even longer - requiring rendezvous with two KC-135 tankers about halfway through each sortie. Even using the flying boom, completing the refueling sequence could take 45 minutes or more. Had we relied on probe-and-drogue refueling, those missions would have been far less practical.

In the Air Force, we often joke that flying boom refueling is "full service"- the boom operator puts the gas in your tank. Probe-and-drogue refueling is "self-service" because the receiver pilot has to fly the probe into the basket himself. It's all good-natured interservice humor.

So what are some of the planning factors that must be considered? Neither the U.S. Navy nor the U.S. Marine Corps operate boom-equipped tanker aircraft. During carrier operations, tactical aircraft are normally refueled by other aircraft within the carrier air wing, most commonly F/A-18 Super Hornets equipped with buddy refueling stores.

The Navy is fielding the MQ-25 Stingray unmanned tanker to reduce this limitation. Every Super Hornet assigned to the tanker mission is one fewer aircraft available to carry weapons on strike or air-defense missions.

Fleet support by land-based Navy P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and Navy E-6B Mercury airborne command post relies on aerial refueling by the Air Force - the airframes require boom refueling. The bottom photo here is a USAF KC-135 refueling a USN E-6B over my house (red dot) on the south Oregon coast on aerial refueling track AR-8A South.

Here is where it can become more complicated. The United Kingdom, one of our closest allies, operates four type of Boeing aircraft. These Royal Air Force (RAF) assets are the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, the RC-135 Airseeker (similar to the USAF RC-135V/W Rivet Joint) signals intelligence reconnaissance platform, the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and the C-17 Globemaster III heavy transport.

These aircraft all require flying boom refueling. However, the RAF Voyager tanker fleet is equipped eclusively for probe-and-drogue refueling. Currently there are no plans to retrofit any of the tankers to add a boom capability, nor are there plans to acquire such tankers in the future.

As a result, the RAF must rely on allied air forces with boom-equipped tankers for refueling. While some European countries have with this capability, none have anywhere near the capability of the U.S. Air Force.

Let's look at a real world example of how aerial refueling extends the reach of American airpower, even beyond that of the U.S. Navy carriers. At times, there is nothing like five acres of American sovereign territory - and the carrier strike group that sails with it - to project power. At other times, only long-range land-based aviation can reach the target.

This is USAF B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, one of the most advanced aircraft in the world. It is currently the only aircraft in the U.S. inventory that can carry the 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator.

That aircraft-and-weapon combination was employed during the June 2025 American strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Seven of these bombers flew over 36 hours to and from the targets in Iran.

The operation required refueling support from 32 tanker aircraft operating from multiple locations. Without aerial refueling, a mission of that distance and duration would simply not have been possible.

While the fighters and bombers may get the headlines, much of what they accomplish relies on the tankers. Aerial refueling is not simply a support function, it is what makes American global airpower possible.

Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part One)

2026-07-22T16:23:16.021-07:00

USAF KC-46A Pegasus refueling an A-10 Warthog *

Last week, the United States asked the Israeli government to increase the number of U.S. Air Force aerial refueling aircraft temporarily based at Ben Gurion International Airport. At the time of the request, there were about 60 tankers at Ben Gurion. The presence of this number of USAF aircraft has reduced the capacity of the airport by about 70 percent.

Increasing the number of tankers to almost 100 aircraft would severly limit civilian air traffic into and out of Israel's primary and largest airport. Israel has agreed to the increased number of tankers, but they will be based at Israeli air bases instead.

Why does the USAF need so many tankers? Aerial refueling is a major mission for the USAF, and an important mission for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The U.S. Army has only a few refuelable helicopters, mostly belonging the the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment - these are almost always refueled by the USAF Special Operations Command's MC-130 aircraft.

Why is aerial refueling important? I am going to use some graphics from one of my cruise ship presentations about the 2025 and 2026 Israeli and U.S. air operations against Iran.

Given the distances between air bases and targets, aerial refueling plays a major role. For example, the distance between air bases in Israel and targets in Iran can be 1000 miles or more.

Most Israeli aircraft cannot fly that distance unrefueled. Unfortunately, Israel has only six aging B707 refueling aircraft. They have ordered the KC-46A Pegasus, but they have not been delivered.

Israeli Air Force refueling F-15I Ra'am aircraft

Because of that shortage, the USAF provided KC-46A tanker support to Israeli aircraft on their way to and from Iran during Operation Rising Lion.

USAF KC-46A refueling Israeli Air Force F-35

Given the lack of an adequate number of tanker aircraft, there are other solutions to extend the range of fighter aircraft. The Israelis make extensive use of conformal fuel tanks (CFT) and external drop tanks. CFT are attached to the aircraft and are aerodynamically designed to cause less drag than coventional drop tanks, which are carried under the fuselage and/or wings.

Here are an F-15I and F-16I with CFT. Please note that these aircraft are also carrying drop tanks.

This picture below highlights the problem of not having sufficient aerial refueling capability.

F-16I Sufa ready to go to Iranian targets

Again, this F-16I is outfitted with CFT as well as three external drop tanks. It is only carrying two air-to-ground munitions, in this case SPICE 1000-pound precision-guided munitions, plus wingtip-mounted AIM-120 air-to-air missiles in the off-chance that the virtually destroyed Iranian air force attempted to engage.

That's a long way to go to drop just two weapons. Most of the aircraft capability is tied up in carrying enough fuel to make the round-trip sortie.

This illustrates the fuel-munitions tradeoff. For those not familiar with air operations, a quick review. The limiting factor for air operations planners is the gross takeoff weight of an aircraft. Start with an aircraft with no fuel or munitions. For example, an empty F-15I weighs about 32,700 pounds, with a gross takeoff weight about 81,000 pounds. That leaves almost 50,000 pounds of payload.

This is where the USAF excels in the use of aerial refueling. When possible, aircraft are loaded with a maximum munitions load and a minumum fuel load. Immediately after takeoff, the aircraft meets a tanker prepositioned near the base, where it takes on as full a fuel load as possible. Now, it is a fully armed and fully fueled aircraft.

That's why we put so many of our resources into aerial refueling. It is a force multiplier. Fun fact: 75 percent of world's aerial refueling aircraft belong to the U.S. Air Force.

We do this better than anyone in the world.

Note: Part Two will discuss types of refueling and issues for some of our allies. (Click here to go to Part 2.)
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* Yes, I know the official name of the A-10 is the Thunderbolt II. In over 27 years of service in the USAF, I can probably count on one hand the number of times anyone in the field called it anything but the Warthog, usually with admiration and respect. It is a fearsome weapon system.

It's "Houthis" with a TH

2026-07-20T23:04:00.000-07:00

The Houthis in Yemen - their logo and spokesman

Public Service Announcement for journalists, reporters, anchors, news readers, media analysts, and anyone else who has reason to comment on the Iranian proxy group in Yemen, the "Supporters of God" (أنصار الله) the movement's official name, often rendered as Ansar Allah.

They are more commonly called "the Houthis" (الحوثيون). The name "Houthi" comes from the family's surname, not from a religious or tribal title.

The movement is named after the al-Houthi (الحوثي) family, particularly its founder, Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi (حسين بدر الدين الحوثي)., who launched the movement in the 1990s in Yemen's northern Sa'da Governorate.

It is pronounced: "the WHO-thees". I add this to correct the mispronunciation by those who want to sound like they know what they are talking about, changing the Arabic letter ث (thāʾ) — (th as in think) -- to a T, resulting in WHO-tees.

Unlike many other languages that do not have the TH sound, Arabic has three different distinct letters that employ that linguistic dental fricative sound.

All of those who insist on converting the TH to a T only highlight their lack of understanding of the language and the region.

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran's View of the MOU

2026-07-04T10:48:51.890-07:00

Let's talk about the "Strait of Hormuz."

In an interview aired yesterday on Al Jazeera TV, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf spoke of his interpretation of Iran's future role as it concerns the Strait of Hormuz.

The takeaways:

We will not permit the United States to interfere in the Strait of Hormuz.

We have agreed with the Sultanate of Oman on the navigation mechanism in [the Strait of] Hormuz based on the fifth article of the memorandum of understanding.

We are proceeding with the implementation of the [Strait of] Hormuz navigation mechanism and will consult with the countries bordering [our] territorial waters.

It is clear from Ghalibaf's statements that he views the Strait of Hormuz as the territorial waters of Iran, and if pressed, jointly owned by Iran and the Sultanate of Oman. In his view, it is anything but how the world sees the Strait - an international waterway with free access to all. He is on record claiming that control of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's right, and that Iran will not relinquish control under any circumstances.

Ghalibaf is not alone in this belief. Iran's deputy foreign minister unilaterally informed Omani officials that Iran alone will determine the transit routes in the Strait, and prohibit the use of other routes. Again, this is the Iranians ignoring the fact that the Strait of Hormuz is a declared international waterway according to the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Strait is neither Iranian nor Omani territorial waters.

It gets even better. On May 18, Iran announced the creation of the Strait of Hormuz Administration. Iran unilaterally declared that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will exercise control over the area shown in yellow on the map.

The lines run from the western edge of Qeshm island in Iran to Umm al-Quwayn in the UAE, and from Jabal Mubarak, Iran to Fujayrah, UAE. The area includes not only the international waterway, but also Omani territorial waters.

This attempt flies in the face of a variety of international agreements that prohibit either Iran or Oman from restricting passage through the strait or charging a toll.

Why are the Iranians taking these what I would call unwarranted actions?

The answer is the imprecise wording of the last sentence in the fifth article of the memorandum of understanding between the Iran and the United States. It reads:

"The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf littoral states, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz."

Ghalibaf's comments suggest that Tehran interprets this sentence to mean that Iran and Oman will jointly administer and manage the Strait, rather than merely establish navigational procedures to ensure the safe passage of commercial shipping. The map and declaration that the IRGC will exercise control over a huge swath of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman - including the entire Strait of Hormuz - far exceeds the provisions of this statement.

In the end, the Iranians and Omanis will have to allow free passage - the legal term is "right of transit" - through the Strait with no tolls or fees. If Iran attempts to enforce a contrary interpretation, it would almost certainly invite a direct challenge from the United States and possibly other maritime powers.

"Is My Daughter an American Citizen?"

2026-07-02T06:28:51.653-07:00

American and Saudi Passports

Let's talk about "birthright citizenship.”

The recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling affirming absolute birthright citizenship has generated considerable discussion on both sides of the issue. I have my own views, but it is not germane to this discussion of birthright citizenship.

It is January 17, 1991. Operation Desert Shield – the defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – has transformed into Operation Desert Storm, the campaign to liberate the State of Kuwait. Throughout the night, hundreds of coalition aircraft pound targets in Baghdad and other key locations in Iraq.

Before dawn the next morning, the Iraqis responded with al-Husayn ballistic missile attacks on Riyadh, Dhahran, and Israel. The war was on.

The atmosphere in Saudi Arabia had changed dramatically over the previous five months.

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Four days later, President George H.W. Bush ordered American forces to Saudi Arabia. The lead elements—the "division-ready" brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and the U.S. Air Force's 1st Tactical Fighter Wing—arrived on August 7.

In those months leading up to the war, we American troops spent a lot of time working alongside Saudi officers. When not interpreting for General Schwarzkopf, I worked in the in the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). I had become close to several of the Saudi officers—they were intrigued with any American or Westerner who had learned their language.

Watching the change in their demeanor from our arrival in August to the attack on Iraq was fascinating. Many of the officers I came to know had grown up in relative privilege and had never imagined that their country might face a direct military threat. As tensions mounted and the coalition buildup accelerated, some quietly began looking for a safety net—a way out should the worst happen.

One afternoon, a Royal Saudi Air Defense Force brigadier with whom I had become friends, approached me and asked if we could speak in private.

Once alone in his office, he asked whether it was true that people born in the United States were automatically American citizens. I told him that I believed that to be true in most cases.

He explained that years earlier as a young officer, he had attended the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas. While there, his wife had given birth to their daughter at the post’s hospital. He wanted to know if his daughter was, in fact, a U.S. citizen.

Not being an immigration lawyer, I contacted a friend in the Consular Section of U.S. Embassy in Riyadh explained the situation. Her first question surprised me – did he have diplomatic status?

I hadn't even considered that. I asked the brigadier whether he had been assigned to the Saudi Embassy or had any form of diplomatic accreditation while he was in the United States. He had not. He had simply been a military student attending training at an Army post in Texas.

My friend at the Embassy clarified for me. If he had enjoyed diplomatic immunity, neither he nor his wife would have been “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, a key requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a foreign military officer attending school in the United States, he and his wife were fully subject to American civil and criminal law. Their daughter therefore acquired U.S. citizenship at birth.

Although she had been eligible since birth, her parents had never applied for documentation, not thinking that it would ever be needed.

Within a month, I had arranged for her U.S. passport, and presented it to her father along with an American flag. His smile said everything - he invited me to his office for “tea.” If you've ever served in Saudi Arabia, you know exactly what that means.

_____

Note: Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under his interpretation, the daughter may not have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth since her father was posted in the United States on a temporary basis. I get it, but it felt good to be able to do this for the brigadier and his daughter.

Abdul Carter - What's in a name?

2026-06-01T10:30:00.000-07:00

Abdul Carter and Jason Dart

Let's talk about "Abdul Carter."

There was a bit of controversy over New York Giants quarterback Jason Dart. Carter criticized Dart for introducing President Trump at a rally - not that it is any of Carter's business.

I was struck by the name Abdul Carter. I have been dealing with this for decades, mostly among young men who claim to have converted to Islam.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, there was a team of Saudi imams (we called them the God Squad) who would roam the joint commannd center and target Americans for conversion, including me, with offers of money, trips, gifts. They assumed that because I could speak Arabic, I would be a potential convert. I didn't take the time to explain that we in the intelligence services normally learn the languages of our potential foes....

Many of these converts take on what they think are Muslim names. I am not sure if Carter is a convert or was born into a Muslim family. In any case, I would recommend that they learn either a smattering of the Arabic language, or the concept of the 99 attributes of Allah.

Abdul cannot stand alone as a name.

It is actually the word 'Abd (meaning "servant of") and the Arabic definite article al- (meaning "the"). It is followed by one of the attributes of Allah.

So when I am introduced to a new convert, and he says his name is "Abdul" - I ask him "'Abd al- WHAT?" Virtually every time, I get a blank stare. This is when I cease to take them seriously. Although I am not a Muslim, I generally know more about it than they do.

So, in deference to either Carter or his parents, I will acknowledge that his middle name is Jabbar (meaning "the compellor" or "the almighty") - the same as the basketball legend Karim Abdul Jabbar. As with both, the correct transliteration of the Arabic ( عبد الجبار ) would be 'Abd al-Jabbar. It is not a first and middle name, or a middle name and last name - it is one name.

In the Middle East, if you introduce yourself as Abdul, you will get a puzzled look meaning 'Abd al- WHAT?

The Medjool Date - No Longer "Unknown"

2025-12-12T10:58:00.000-08:00

Shields Date Garden - Indio, California

Time for some Arabic language trivia.

Most of you are probably familiar with the Medjool date. They’re one of the most popular date varieties in the world.

The name Medjool comes from the Arabic word majhul (مجهول) meaning "unknown" or "unidentified." It was applied to this variety of date because its place of origin was unknown and the dates do not grow in the same manner as other dates.

With the advent of DNA testing, scientists have been able to determine that the "unknown" date variety originated in a specific grove in the Tafilalt region in eastern Morocco.

Today, California’s Coachella Valley produces more Medjool dates than almost any other region in the world.

Since it is no longer an unknown date, should it not be renamed the ma'ruf (معروف) or "known" date? Or call it the Tafilalt variety?

Yes, I am being facetious....

"Palestinian Exhaustion" – Thoughts on Hamas and the Trump Plan

2025-10-10T16:10:00.000-07:00

In a whirlwind of activity in the Middle East that has resulted in the success of the Trump plan for what appears to be a permanent ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, one has to wonder about the thought process on the Hamas side that led to the agreement.

The question most of those of us who specialize in the Middle East are asking is, “Why would Hamas agree to give up what is their ace-in-the-hole during the entire two year confrontation, the Israeli hostages*?”

The hostages were all that was preventing the Israelis from going what we Christians would call “Old Testament” on Hamas. If they had not had these “detainees,” I believe that the Israel Defense Forces would have laid waste to the entire Gaza Strip.

For those not familiar with the geography, the Gaza Strip is about 25 miles long and seven miles wide, home to about 2.3 million people. We do not have good number on how many of them support Hamas, but at one point, 70 percent of Gazans supported the attacks of October 7, 2023.

That has since declined as the IDF has turned the area into the rubble that resembles Dresden in 1945, but the remaining level of support for the group that is responsible for creating one the greatest humanitarian crises in modern times is astounding.

Let’s go back to the agreement between Hamas and Israel. I understand the pressure applied on Israel by President Donald Trump and other world leaders. What I remain curious about is the pressure applied on Hamas – and it was there – from Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey. I believe that it was the pressure from Turkey that may have carried the day.

It is no secret that Turkish President is an avowed Islamist, a behind-the-scenes supporter of both Hamas and the Islamic State – after all, how did all those ISIS fighters get into Syria and Iraq? I have spent a lot of time on both sides of the border between Turkey and Syria. It is a serious border, especially on the Turkish side, complete with fencing, lighting, guard towers, and minefields. ISIS fighters crossing from Turkey into Syria had to have assistance – either bribery, government collusion, or both.

As is the case with many countries in the Arab and Muslim worlds, Turkey has been a political and diplomatic supporter of Hamas. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has defined Hamas as liberation movement. Even after the October 7, 2023 massacre, he was quoted as saying, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a group of mujahidin (holy warriors) defending their lands.”

Why was Turkey at the talks?

My take on this is that most of the Arab and Muslim world, and now likely including Turkey, is suffering from “Palestinian Exhaustion.” In other words, they are tired of the Palestinians in general, and Hamas in particular. Even countries that had previously supported the Palestinians — some even condoning the violence of October 7 — have watched for two years as Israel destroyed virtually the entire infrastructure of the Gaza Strip, with no indication that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intended to stop before Hamas was completely eradicated.

I suspect that the leadership of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey informed what is left of the leadership of Hamas that it was time to stop the fighting. At last count, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, the death toll in Gaza is over 67,000 with almost 170,000 injured, and as many as 11,000 missing (believed to be under the rubble). Hamas has lost most of its senior leadership inside and outside of the Gaza Strip, civilian casualties continue to mount, and there was no possible path to any sort of meaningful victory.

The Trump plan, among other things, calls for the immediate return of the 48 hostages (only 20 of whom are thought to be alive), phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip, and the disarming of Hamas. Hamas is still refusing to disarm.

I am surprised that Hamas has agreed to release the remaining hostages in the first phase. While the Israelis have begun the initial phase of their withdrawal, they are still in Gaza with overwhelming military force. Once the hostages are released, Hamas’s leverage is gone. It was their sole bargaining chip. Hamas will now have to rely on whatever security guarantees were made by the negotiating parties in Sharm al-Shaykh.

Hamas realistically had no choice. Support for Hamas in the Arab and Muslim world was declining, the Israelis were relentlessly pursuing Hamas members in the last bastion of Gaza City, and even the hard-core could see that it was only a matter of time before they would be all killed or captured.

___________

* When the international press referred to the Israelis taken on October 7 as “hostages” – the Arabic word is (رهائن – raha’in), most of the Arabic media was offended. They refer to those taken as “detainees” (محتجزين – muhtajazin), which must be some lesser category. When I was the interpreter for the U.S.-Iraqi talks at the end of Desert Storm, this was the agreed-upon word for Kuwaiti prisoners. The Iraqis had referred to them as “guests”( ضيوف – dhiyuf) until I officially objected.

Syrian President Abolishes October 6 Holiday

2025-10-06T15:11:00.000-07:00

Memorial on east bank of Suez Canal where Egyptian troops crossed on October 6, 1973

In a rather surpring move, Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara' announced the abolishment of the October 6 holiday. Officially, it was called “Tishrin Liberation Day” (Arabic: عيد حرب تشرين التحريرية), which commemorated an initially successful Syrian military operation aimed a retaking the Golan Heights from the Israelis. Israel had captured the Heights in the Six-Day War of 1967, and has not only occupied the area, but has formally annexed it to the State of Israel.*

The October 6, 1973 operation was part of joint Egyptian-Syrian coordinated attacks on Israeli-occupied territory in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Egypt also celebrates the perceived "victory" on October 6 as Armed Forces Day. The Egyptian army was able to cross the Suez Canal and break through the Israeli defenses, although with heavy casualties.

The Syrian decree drew sharp criticism throughout the Arab world, particularly Egypt. While both Syria and Egypt view their performance in the two-week conflict as a victory, it was a stalemate at best, a defeat at worst. The rest of the Arab world goes along with the mischaracterization as it provides some relief from the humiliation that usually follows their military clashes with the Israel Defense Forces.

I have always been amazed that both Egypt and Syria regard their military operations in the Yom Kippur War as a victory. Let's take a quick look at what started as successful assaults, but soon withered in the face of Israeli counterattacks. It took a few days for the Israelis to stop the advances and activate enough of their reserve forces to mount counteroffensives on two fronts.

First, Egypt. Yes, the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and broke through the Israeli defenses, a series of fixed fotifications along the canal known as the Bar-Lev Line. They used water cannons to breach the high sand berms, and built pontoon bridges to move enough troops to overwhelm the sparesly manned fortifications.

The success of that part of the operation has become a teaching point in many military schools - static defenses can be overcome by determined troops using innovative tactics. So, yes, initial success.

Israeli forces pulled back and regrouped. As reinforcements and reserves arrived, the Israelis counterattacked. They eventually encircled the entire Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai and cut them off from resupply and reinforcement, effectively taking them off the battlefield without having to defeat them militarily.

Other Israeli forces crossed the canal and proceeded down the main highway towards Cairo, eventually reaching a position known as Kilometer 101, just over 60 miles from the capital city, where they were located when the ceasefire took effect.

Egyptian victory? Hardly. Yet, it is celebrated like they just won World War II.

Now Syria. Yes, Syria was able to seize portions of the Golan Heights from Israeli forces, only to be forced back as the Israelis regrouped and launched a counteroffensive, advancing on the main road from al-Qunaytirah toward Damascus.**

By the time a ceasefire had been arranged, Israeli troops were as far along the road as the town of Sa'sa', roughly 18 miles from the city. That placed the Syrian capital within artillery range of Israeli gunners.

Syrian victory? Hardly. I will say this for the Syrians. There never seems to be the level of celebration there as compared to the massive celebrations in Egypt. It's hard to claim victory when the opposing army can fire artillery into the capital city.

Shara' may be making a gesture to Israel. There have been a series of talks between Syria and Israel possibly leading to a security arrangement between the two countries. Tension with Israel is something the Syrian president doesn't need. He has his hands full with not only the Druze in the south, but also the Kurds in the northeast, and al-Asad loyalists in the northwest. Then there are the parliamentary elections - you get it.

________

* In 1981, Israel announced "application of Israeli law and administration," replacing the military administration of the area. Although the word "annexation" has never been used, it is in effect what it is. Only the United States recognizes Israeli sovereignty, done so by President Trump in 2019.

** This is the same "road to Damascus" traveled by the apostle Paul (then Saul) cited in the Bible. During my assignment as the Air Attache at the embassy in Damascus, I traveled this road regularly "observing and reporting." There is a Russian Orthodox chapel at what is believed to be the spot of his conversion. And there's a huge Syrian military facility there as well....

Today’s Trivia – “From the River to the Sea”

2025-09-27T11:37:00.000-07:00

“From the River to the Sea” - You’ve heard it at all of the anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian, or Hamas-support demonstrations. It is the oft-repeated mantra that most of those who are shouting it likely have no idea what it means. The modern mantra includes the additional phrase “Palestine will be free.”

In Arabic, the words rhyme: it is pronounced “min al-BAHar ilah an-NAHar” – in Arabic, the definite article AL before the letter N changes to AN.*

For those not exactly sure what it means, it’s quite simple. The river is the Jordan River, and the sea is the Mediterranean Sea. While the meaning is quite simple, the implication is not.

A look at a map that shows the area between the Jordan and the Mediterranean reveals that what the Palestinians believe is their country would include what is now the State of Israel, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Gaza Strip.

That is basically the complete territory of the British-administered Palestinian Mandate. The map to the left shows the United Nations partition plan of the Mandate proposed in 1947.

Use of the chant “from the river to the sea” is a call for the elimination of the state of Israel. It also is a refutation of the so-called “two-state solution” called for by the United Nations, European Union, Palestinian Authority, some Arab countries, and even some Israeli political parties. As you would expect, both Hamas and most Israelis are against the plan.

Ask virtually any of the protesters to explain it – most of them can’t.

_________________

* In Arabic grammar and pronunciation, the concepts of solar letters and lunar letters are essential for correctly pronouncing the definite article (“al‑”). Do a ChatGPT search on “Arabic solar and lunar letters” for a complete explanation. It’s a complicated language.

United Kingdom: The Royal Air Force and Power Projection

2025-09-21T21:57:00.000-07:00

In response to the obvious question - what does this have to do with the Middle East? While doing some research on the U.S. strike on the Iranian nuclear facility at Fordow nuclear enrichment facility, specifically the use of aerial refueling to support the B-2 bomber attack, I discovered an interesting fact about what I believe is a Royal Air Force refueling shortfall.

Over the last few years, the Royal Air Force (RAF) has acquired more modern aircraft that normally would allow significant power projection capability in addition to enhanced regional operations.

These include:

- E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft

- P-8A Poseidon (RAF designation Poseidon MRA1) maritime patrol and - anti-submarine warfare aircraft

- C-17A Globemaster III strategic airlifter

- RC-135W Rivet Joint (RAF name Airseeker) signals intelligence (SIGINT) platform

All of these aircraft were built by Boeing Defense, Space & Security, and include aerial refueling capability via the flying boom system. In this system, fuel is transferred from a tanker aircraft to a receiver aircraft via a rigid, telescoping tube called a boom, which is controlled by a boom operator on the tanker.

This system is used extensively by the U.S. Air Force, as well as air forces that operate many American built aircraft, such as the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, and the F-35A.

Flying boom: U.S. Air Force KC-46A Pegasus refuels a Royal Australian Air Force E-7A Wedgetail

Although the RAF operates a fleet of 14 aerial refueling tankers, none of them are equipped with the flying boom system.

The RAF tankers are Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft and are only equipped with a probe-and-drogue refueling system. In this method, a flexible hose with a drogue (a small parachute-like basket) is trailed from the tanker aircraft, and the receiving aircraft inserts a rigid probe into the drogue to receive fuel.

This system is used by the U.S. Navy* and Marine Corps, as well as air forces that operate some U.S. built aircraft such as the F-18 and some versions of the F-35. Most foreign-built aircraft, many in service with the RAF, are designed to use this system as well.

Royal Air Force Voyager KC3 refueling two Eurofighter Typhoons

Airbus offers a flying boom capability for the A330 MRTT, however, there are no plans to retrofit any of the existing 14 RAF KC2 or KC3 tankers with the Airbus Aerial Refueling Boom System (ARBS).

Of note, the 14 Airbus A330 MRTT Voyager aircraft are owned, managed, and maintained by a private consortium called AirTanker Services Ltd on a 27-year contract that was signed in 2007. The RAF leases these aircraft and its crews operate them for military operations.

This lack of flying boom refueling capability presents an issue for RAF operations planners. Should the United Kingdom have a need to deploy an expeditionary force to anywhere beyond the unrefueled range of these aircraft, they will need to obtain assistance from one of the air forces that operate boom equipped tankers. Also, they have to consider how long they will want the E-7 and RC-135 to remain on station providing command and control, and electronic intelligence support.

Who will they rely on? Obviously, their first call will be to the U.S. Air Force. There is an already established relationship between the two air forces. If for some unlikely reason the U.S cannot or will not support the RAF, there are other options. These are the air forces that operate boom-equipped tankers: United States, France, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Australia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Israel, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Chile.

NATO also operates nine boom-equipped aircraft in a partnership of the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Czech Republic.

______________

* U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and E-6B communications relay aircraft require flying boom refueling, and thus are normally refueled by U.S. Air Force tankers.

U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker refuels a U.S. Navy E-6B TACAMO over our house (red dot)

Russian Deployment of North Korean Artillery in Ukraine

2025-07-17T14:36:00.000-07:00

170mm Koksan self-propelled howitzer in Iraq

A recent article in Military Watch magazine reported on Russia's use of North Korean-made heavy artillery in Ukraine. The article was based on comments made by the commander of the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate.

“Unfortunately, this gun is demonstrating itself quite well in battle. It’s firing from quite a long range, and it’s quite good in terms of accuracy. We have data that the Russian Federation was provided 120 pieces. But I think that supply will continue because these guns are demonstrating themselves quite well. This is unfortunate for us because this is artillery for long-range firing.”

Why I am writing about a North Korean artillery piece being used by Russian forces in Ukraine? This is, after all, Middle East Perspectives by Rick Francona. Read on.

I am very familiar with the Koksan gun. In fact, I believe I am one of the few Americans who have ever had the opportunity to get in, on, and under the weapon. I took the above photograph in 1988 at an Iraqi Army artillery depot south of Baghdad. At the time, I was serving as a liaison officer to the Iraqi Directorate of Military Intelligence at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. It was the eighth year of the Iran-Iraq War; we had developed a relationship with the Iraqis to prevent a recurrence of Iraq's mistaken attack on the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf in 1987 in which 37 sailors were killed.

I wrote about this experience in my book, Ally to Adversary - An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace. From the book:

PROJECT MORNING STAR

Our cooperative relationship with the Iraqis allowed us unprecedented access to the Iraqi military. For example, the Iraqis had captured a large artillery piece from the Iranians during the liberation of Al-Faw. They could not identify its origin and were perplexed by the unusual 170-mm bore. Artillery pieces worldwide are generally manufactured in standard bore sizes, normally 122-mm, 130-mm, 152-mm, 155- mm, 175-mm, and 203-mm. We knew they had captured this gun: Army Colonel Gary Nelson—our newly assigned defense attaché in Baghdad and an artillery officer by training—had seen it while it was on display at a victory celebration in Baghdad. We knew what it was, and we wanted it.

The Iranians had acquired this self-propelled howitzer in 1987. At that time, it was the longest-range artillery piece made anywhere in the world, capable of firing a rocket-assisted projectile to a range of almost sixty kilometers. It had been used by the Iranians to conduct harassment fire from the Al-Faw Peninsula into Kuwait’s northeastern oil fields. The Iranians were applying military pressure on the Kuwaitis in a variety of ways, as punishment for supporting Iraq in the war and for alleged violations of oil export and pricing policies of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). This artillery fire was complemented by Chinese-made “Silkworm” cruise missile attacks on Kuwait’s oil ports and by naval attacks on Kuwaiti shipping in the Gulf.

The attacks were the catalyst for the March 1987 decision to register Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American flag (a procedure called “reflagging”) to offer some protection for oil shipping in the region. The U.S. Navy could not legally protect foreign shipping, but a merchant ship flying the U.S. flag was entitled to armed escort through the Persian Gulf war zone.

The high level of U.S. interest in the gun had little to do with the situation in the Persian Gulf and rested instead on the fact that the weapon had been designed half a world away to fire on the capital city of a close U.S. ally, South Korea. What the Iraqis had captured on the Al-Faw Peninsula, though they did not realize it, was a weapon designed and built by North Korea to fire on Seoul from the North Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. military refers to it as a Koksan gun.

While inspecting the gun (the project was called Morning Star), we discovered more evidence of Iraq’s use of nerve gas. As I rooted around the cramped driver’s station of the gun system looking for anything of intelligence value—maps, notes, logs, manuals, firing tables, communications charts, and so forth—I found several used atropine injectors. These auto-injectors had been manufactured in Iran and were similar to those I had found earlier on a battlefield on Al-Faw. I showed one of the injectors (and pocketed another) to both Majid and the brigadier general commanding the artillery depot, explaining that these used injectors indicated to me that a nerve agent had been used at Al-Faw.

I was careful not to accuse the Iraqis, but the implication was clear. The brigadier general replied that Iraqi artillery doctrine calls for use of obscurant smoke in the preparatory artillery barrages. His “analysis” was that the Iranians mistook the smoke rounds for nerve gas and, therefore, self-administered atropine.

Not wanting a confrontation while standing in the middle of an Iraqi military installation, I did not mention to the Iraqi officers that we had also discovered decontamination fluid in many places on the weapon, most noticeably trapped in the headlights. It would make no sense for the Iraqis to decontaminate the vehicle if they had only fired smoke rounds at the Iranians.

In the end, the Iraqis decided not to allow us to move the gun back to the United States, so I arranged for a small team of artillery experts and engineers to fly to Iraq and do a field exploitation of the piece. I remember that working on the gun in the blazing sun in the Iraqi desert was, and still is, the hottest I have every been. My insides felt like I was being roasted.

Just as the Ukrainian intelligence chief noted, the gun was well-engineered and manufactured. It was an intelligence boon - these guns pose a threat to U.S. forces in South Korea.

Movie Review: 6 Days (General Film Corp - 2017)

2024-10-08T22:40:00.000-07:00

6 Days is a 2017 joint British and New Zealand production based on the events of April-May 1980 when six armed gunmen stormed the Iranian Embassy in London and took 26 people hostage. The perpetrators of the takeover were Iranian Arabs from the Khuzestan area of Iran. These Arabs are one of the ethnic groups that make up the country, and have at times sought independence from Tehran. That effort continues today.

The six gunmen traveled to the United Kingdom on Iraqi passports. The weapons they used in the attack on the embassy were brought into the UK in diplomatic shipments to the Iraqi Embassy - the entire operation was planned by the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn was a supporter of the uprising by the Iranian Arabs – at one point, he wanted to annex Khuzestan to Iraq.

After taking control of the embassy, the gunmen demanded that Iran release 91 Arab prisoners in Iranian custody, and that they be provided safe passage out of the United Kingdom. Iran refused the first demand, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher refused the second – the siege began.

Two teams of the British Army’s elite 22nd Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment were deployed to London and began planning various options to rescue the hostages and either capture or kill the perpetrators.

The movie details each of the six days alternately through the eyes of BBC reporter Kate Adie, SAS team member Lance Corporal Rusty Firmin, and Metropolitan Police hostage negotiator Max Vernon.

Vernon played a critical trying to keep the situation from spiraling out of control . Eventually, he was able to secure the release of five hostages. On the sixth day, one of the perpetrators killed the Iranian Embassy chief press officer.

That murder triggered the approval from Mrs. Thatcher for the SAS teams to assault the embassy, attempt to free the hostages, and either capture or kill the perpetrators.

The SAS did just that. They assaulted the building, much of it caught on broadcast media, and succeeded in rescuing 19 of the remaining 20 hostages; one was killed in the attack, and two others were wounded. Five of the perpetrators were killed by the SAS teams, and one was captured. He was sentenced to life in prison, but was paroled in 2008. He was allowed to remain in the UK since neither Iran nor Iraq would take him, and lives in London under an assumed identity.

The assault took 17 minutes.

Let’s take look at the conditions that led these Iranian Arabs to conduct this attack. In 1979, after the Iranian Islamic revolution had brought down the Shah, there was an uprising in Khuzestan, fed by demands of autonomy. The uprising was crushed by Iranian security forces, resulting in more than a hundred combined casualties from both sides.

Since 1999, the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA), headquartered in Denmark and The Netherlands has advocated for an independent Arab state in Khuzestan, and has committed acts of terrorism and assassinations in support of this goal. The group is allegedly financed and sponsored by Saudi Arabia.

My major issue with the movie: Subtitles claim that the terrorists, nationalists from the ethnic-Arab Khuzestan area around Abadan, are speaking Arabic. Anyone with more than a week’s language training in either Arabic or Farsi will know that this is Farsi, the language of the majority Persians. Khuzestani Iranians mostly speak Arabic as their native language, but of course, also speak Persian. I would have expected them, given the context of the film, to be speaking Arabic. Yes, I know, small knit pick, but it does impact the credibility of the movie.

How close are the two languages? Arabic is a Semitic language, along with Hebrew and Maltese. Farsi is an Indo-European language in the family of Dari. Urdu, Pashto, and Hindi. There are many crossover words in Farsi that appear to be Arabic, but have different meanings – the linguistics scholars call that a “false cognizant” and is enough to get you in trouble if you think you know the actual meaning.

Strong performances by Mark Strong as Max Vernon, Jamie Bell as Rusty Firmin, and Abbie Cornish as Kate Adie. Since this was closely based on actual events, there was almost no suspension of disbelief required to watch and enjoy this presentation.

I recommend it – it moves quickly and can be intense.

Watch on Amazon Prime.

Movie Review: Damascus Cover (Vertical Entertainment - 2017)

2024-10-06T14:32:00.000-07:00

Damascus Cover is a 2017 espionage film, based on the 1977 Howard Kaplan novel of the same name. The book is the first of four in Kaplan’s The Jerusalem Spy Series. I have not read the book. There are a few confusing scenes, but it can be difficult to boil 321 pages into a 90-minute screenplay.

Mossad officer Ari Ben-Sion, working undercover as German businessman Hans Hoffmann in Berlin in 1989, is recalled and ordered to Damascus to help a Jewish family flee the country. This turns out not to be his actual mission, which is revealed to him only once he is on the ground in Syria. I am not sure why he was not just briefed with the real mission so he could properly prepare and train.

There is, of course, the required romantic entanglement – this with an American photojournalist.

There is also the required double-crossing and changes of allegiance as the story unfolds. Hoffman/Ben-Sion adjusts his operation to exfiltrate a Syrian scientist and quickly finds himself in way over his head with lessening chances of success.

I will not describe what happen so as not to spoil it for any of you who wish to see it. You will have to watch it to the very end – I was surprised.

The movie stars Jonathan Rhys Meyers, Olivia Thirlby, Jürgen Prochnow, Igal Naor, Navid Negahban and John Hurt (in his final role).

I must compliment the producers for the excellent attention to detail when it comes to replicating the country of Syria and the city of Damascus in the Moroccan countryside and city of Casablanca, even down to the accurate Damascus street signs, including shari’ madhat basha (A Street Called Straight) and the Hamidiyah suq.

The movie received mixed reviews. I enjoyed it, not only because it took me back to my posting at the US Embassy in Damascus, but because it was a good story not requiring too much suspension of disbelief (except maybe at the very end).

Watch it on Amazon Prime.

REVISED - Miniseries Review: "The Last Post" (BBC - 2017)

2024-06-13T18:15:00.000-07:00

I originally reviewed this excellent miniseries in 2018 soon after it was released. I watched it again because of what is happening in the region, including the Yemeni Houthi involvement in the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza and the West Bank, and I was in the mood for some good entertainment. You can read that initial review here. I was able to get much more out of it the second time – there is a lot there.

I highly recommend it on the same two counts as before. Not only is it solid entertainment – the performances across the board of the BBC production are excellent – but also addresses the British experience in Aden (‘Adan) in the mid-1960’s; It is somewhat applicable to the geopolitical situations in which the United States finds itself today in the region.

"The Last Post"* follows a unit of the Royal Military Police and their families in Aden in 1965. Newlyweds Captain Joe Martin and his wife Honor arrive into the mix and must adapt to their new environment and their new lives together. Throughout the community, relationships are tested as the women struggle against what is expected of them as British Army wives and their own preferences. At work, the soldiers fight a growing local revolutionary insurgency and face constant threats from hand grenades and snipers.

That’s the theatrical story that carries the underlying theme – a declining empire dealing with local nationalism and confronting “liberation” movements. It also deals with military relationships between the officers (and their families), noncommissioned officers, and enlisted troops. It offers insight into the British Army, still one of the best military forces in the world. The series did not fully explain the command relationships between the various military units in Aden, but, this is entertainment, not a documentary. An added predictable touch is meddling from an American journalist (ably played by Australian actress Essie Davis).

On November 30, 1967, British forces withdrew from Aden and the independent People's Republic of South Yemen was proclaimed. It lasted until 1990 when South Yemen and North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) merged to form the Republic of Yemen.

We’ve seen how that has worked out. The port of Aden was the location of the October 12, 2000 terrorist attack on the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) while the ship was conducting an ill-advised, politically-motivated refueling/“show the flag” stop in Yemen. Read my comments on that folly.

I want to give a shout out to the standout performances by Stephen Campbell Moore as Lieutenant Ed Laithwaite (I see some of me in his character), and Jessica Raine and Essie Davis for, well, first, being Jessica Raine and Essie Davis. Jessica Raine’s performance as Alison Laithwaite, a conflicted, alcoholic, unfaithful wife dealing with her marriage, is excellent, often to the haunting rendition by Ketty Lester of “Love Letters (Straight from Your Heart).”

I highly recommend the series. It moves quickly, and despite a few questionable military tactics, requires very little suspension of disbelief to watch.

Watch it on Amazon Prime.

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* The "Last Post" is a British and Commonwealth bugle call used at end of day ceremonies, as well as military funerals, and ceremonies commemorating those who have died in war, similar to the US armed forces’ “Taps.”

Listen to the “Last Post” by the Royal Marines at Prince Philip’s Funeral.

Israeli Airstrike on Iranian Consulate in Damascus Kills Senior Iranian IRGC Leader

2024-04-01T11:44:00.000-07:00

Iranian Consulate - Damascus, Syria

An Israeli airstrike in the early evening hours of April 1 on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, killed the apparent target of the operation, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi.

According to Iranian television, Zahedi was the commander of Qods Force units in Syria and Lebanon. The Qods Force is a capable special operations organization charged with much of Iranian activities in the region and around the world. A previous commander of the Qods Force, Qassem Soleimani, was killed in an American airstrike in Baghdad in January 2020.

According to the semi-official IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, five other IRGC commanders and two advisers were killed in the consulate along with Zahedi. They include Zahedi's deputy and chief or staff. The Islamic Republic News Agency reported that the consulate building was completely destroyed. Syrian television added that everyone in the building was killed.

Mohammad Reza Zahedi

Zahedi is one the IRGC's top commanders with a wealth of operational and command experience. A combat veteran of the Irani-Iraq War, he previously served as the commander of the IRGC Air Force, then commander of the IRGC Ground Force, before taking command of all Qods Forces deployed to Lebanon and Syria - one of the key commands in the IRGC.

The loss of Zahedi and virtually his entire senior staff is a severe blow to Iranian foreign policy in the region - this was a bad day for the Iranians.

I am impressed with the execution of the Israeli operation.

I lived in Damascus not far from these Iranian diplomatic facilities - embassy, consulate, and ambassador's residence. These are located in crowded areas with civilian residential compounds and buildings. The Iranian diplomatic staff in Damascus reported that neither the ambassador nor any other personnel were injured in the attack - this shows the accuracy of the Israeli strike.

It also highlights the ability of the Israeli intelligence services to determine that at least eight IRGC commanders and advisers would be in the consulate building at the same time, and determine it in time to take action to eliminate the targets.

Impressive.

Taliban to revive policy of stoning and flogging women

2024-03-30T11:55:00.000-07:00

Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada

Taliban Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada announces a return to the policy of stoning women:

"We will soon implement the punishment for adultery. We will flog women in public. We will stone them to death in public. We will bring shari'ah to this land.”

How enlightened - stoning and flogging.

Stoning as a form of capital punishment goes back to ancient times. Stoning appears to have been the standard method of capital punishment in ancient Israel. The Torah and Talmud prescribe stoning as punishment for a number of offenses, however, Rabbinic Judaism developed a number of procedural constraints which made these laws practically unenforceable.

Although stoning is not mentioned in the Quran, classical Islamic jurisprudence imposed stoning as a shari'ah punishment for adultery based on hadith (sayings attributed to Muhammad).

Only a few isolated instances of legal stoning are recorded in pre-modern history of the Islamic world. In recent times, stoning has been a legal or customary punishment in Iran, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, parts of Nigeria, Afghanistan, Brunei, and tribal parts of Pakistan. That said, it is rarely practiced - it appears that is about to change in Afghanistan.

If you want to see just how barbaric Islamic stoning is, I recommend the excellent movie The Stoning of Soraya M, a 2008 movie about the stoning of a young woman in Iran.

Scene from "The Stoning of Soraya M"

The movie stars the talented Shohreh Aghdashloo, Mozhan Navabi, and Jim Caviezel, and is available for free on YouTube.

I will caution that the stoning scenes are graphic and intense. The requirements for stoning are quite precise, as shown here (click here for a larger view):

Welcome to the 7th Century.

Interesting Syrian Air Force Flight Activity

2023-02-13T10:23:00.000-08:00

Syrian Air Force IL-76 YK-ATA

The Syrian Air Force (SYAF), officially the Syrian Arab Air Force, operates three Ilyushin IL-76T (NATO: Candid) heavy lift transport aircraft: YK-ATA, YK-ATB, and YK-ATD (shown top to bottom). A fourth aircraft (YK-ATC) has not been operational for almost 30 years.

These are older photos – all three aircraft are in need of depot-level maintenance, upgrade, and overhaul. This is done at at the Ilyushin facility in Ramenskoye, Russia. Based on publicly available flight tracking information, YK-ATD was overhauled in 2016, YK-ATB in 2018, and YK-ATA in 2019.

I suspect that YK-ATD is in dire need of major maintenance - it has not flown since November 24, 2022, and then only for a short domestic flight. It appears to have become what we in the U.S. Air Force refer to as a “hangar queen.”

Do not let the colorful livery of SYRIANAIR (Syrian Airlines) fool you – I have flown on both SYRIANAIR and with the SYAF - they’re different. One is a second-tier Middle East airline with great passenger service, and the other is a third-rate air force transport operation that worried me. I have flown on SYAF Antonov AN-24 (NATO: Coke), Tupolev TU-134 (NATO: Crusty), and Yakovlev YAK-40 (NATO: Codling) aircraft – the condition of the YAK-40 and AN-24 was far below U.S. Air Force standards.

The three IL-76 aircraft are actually assigned to the 585th Transport Squadron of the Syrian Air Force 29th Air Transport Brigade, based at Damascus International Airport.

The military ramp at the airport is southwest of the civilian terminal. I have been on the 29th Brigade ramp a few times to catch attaché flights on the extremely rare occasions when the Syrians included American officers in official attaché trips.

These transports were built in 1980 (YK-ATA and YK-ATB) and 1981 (YK-ATD) – I remember them in the original IL-76MD (military) configuration, complete with tail guns. In the early 2000s, all were converted to their current IL-76T configuration.

Over the past few years, the Syrian IL-76’s made almost daily resupply flights to the regime-controlled enclave of al-Qamishly in northeast Syria, and almost daily flights to Mehrabad airport in Tehran, Iran. Once in a while, one of the aircraft would fly to/from Moscow.

That pattern has changed a bit.

I have noticed a massive increase of SYAF IL-76 flights between Damascus International Airport (read that as 29th Air Brigade) and Benghazi/Beninah International Airport (coincidentally also an air base at which SYAF fighter pilots were assigned to support Mu’amar al-Qadhafi in the 1970s). It is in the area of Libya controlled by Field Marshal Khalifah Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA).

Syrian media reported that Haftar’s armed forces have airlifted relief supplies to victims of the February 6 earthquakes that have devastated part of northern Syria. Some of that aid was delivered by LNA aircraft to the Russian-leased Humaymim air base south of Latakia.

Looking over publicly available flight records for the past three months, an interesting international flight pattern emerges.

YK-ATA has flown 13 round-trip flights between Damascus, Syria and Benghazi, Libya, which seems to be its primary route. It did fly to Moscow three times, Beirut once, and once to, for whatever reason, Oral in northwestern Kazakhstan.

YK-ATB flew seven round-trip flights between Damascus, Syria and Benghazi, Libya. It also flew to Tehran/Mehrabad airport, using a ramp dedicated solely to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), four times. Additionally, it was used at least six times for the routine domestic flight from Damascus to al-Qamishly.

In the last 90 days for the Syrian Air Force, there have been at least:

• 20 round trip flights to Benghazi, Libya (most before the earthquake)

• 4 round trip flights to Tehran/Mehrabad, Iran

• 3 round trip flights to Moscow/Vnukovo, Russia

• 1 round trip flight to Beirut, Lebanon

• 1 round trip flight to Oral, Kazakhstan

I am puzzled by the number of flights to Libya, specifically to the area controlled by Khalifah Haftar. If anyone has any insight into the relationship between Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Khalifah Haftar, please inform me.

I will note that after the earthquakes that created catastrophic damage in northern Syria, all return flights from Benghazi to Syria stopped first in Latakia, and in at least one case in Aleppo, both areas that have suffered catastrophic earthquake damage. I have to assume that these aircraft were transporting relief supplies from Benghazi.

My question: What were the Syrian IL-76 aircraft moving between Damascus and Benghazi before the earthquake?

Miniseries Review: "Fauda - Season 4" (Netflix 2023)

2023-01-30T22:05:00.001-08:00

Fauda (the Arabic word for chaos) Season 4 is now available in the United States, much to the delight of fans of the series – I’m one. The first three seasons* were all “must see,” and this season again is in that category. I will try to avoid spoilers in my review.

This season’s action shifts to the international stage with operational activities in Belgium, Syria, and Lebanon as well as the usual venues of Israel and the West Bank. The antagonists of this season’s operations are also international – Lebanese Hizballah.

The former chief of the IDF special operations unit, Captain Gabi Ayoub, is running an intelligence source inside Hizballah via the Mossad station in Brussels. The source reports that Hizballah is planning a large operation in Israel and the West Bank. This is unprecedented for Hizballah – normally they strike Israeli targets from their home territory in Lebanon. Operating within the Palestinian Authority is an escalation and exactly what Israel does not want – cooperation between Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Gabi and the main character Doron – now brought back out of retirement – travel to Brussels to make contact with the asset. As with many intelligence assets, at times the case officer has to do a bit of “hand-holding” and reassuring. Suffice it to say that once the two get to Brussels, things go downhill quickly. The team follows in support.

The asset Gabi is running – Omar Tawalbe – turns out to be the brother of an Israeli Arab – a female Israeli police officer. Lucy Ayoub’s performance as Maya Binyamin (née Tawalbe) is stellar.

As I have advised in the past three seasons, pay attention to the languages being spoken. For the most part, if the characters’ voices are in English, what you are listening to is Hebrew dubbed into English. When the characters are speaking Arabic, the audio is played in Arabic and subtitled. The Arabic subtitles are an interpretation rather than a literal translation, and are generally well done.

I especially enjoyed this season’s Arabic dialog as the characters not only were speaking the Palestinian Levantine dialect, but also the Lebanese Levantine dialect, depending on the venue of the action. For the most part, the Arabic was excellent, although at times a bit of an Israeli accent was evident. This is important since the special operations team often impersonates Arabs. If you are going to do that, your accent has to be perfect.

There are letters and sounds in Hebrew that do not exist in Arabic, and vice versa. During one of my liaison tours with an Arab intelligence service, the officers explained that when they create security challenges and responses (the “password”), they always chose words that are difficult for native Hebrew speakers to vocalize correctly.

For example, Hebrew-speakers have problems with the Arabic aspirated HAH (what we Arabic linguists sometimes refer to as the “hard H”). Hebrew speakers tend to say the Arabic KHAH – Hizballah normally sounds like Khizballah, which raises a flag that the subject is not a native Arabic speaker.

I will complement one of the actors, Itzik Cohen (playing Captain Ayoub), on his vocalization of Arabic. Cohen does not speak Arabic, and is coached on his lines before each scene. It sounds native to me. In episode 1 (minute 26:45), Cohen/Ayoub breaks into an Arabic song (Habibi ya ‘ayni – My love, my eyes) at a wedding, and it is well done.

Season 4 is a definite must watch. As I have commented in the past, enjoying good fiction requires the literary concept of “suspension of disbelief.” In other words, even though you know that some of the things that happen in a book, movie, or show range from “that’s a stretch” to “that’s not possible,” you suspend your disbelief and enjoy the story.

While there was quite a bit of the suspension of disbelief required in this season, especially the scenes in Syria and Lebanon, it was never to the level that I was tempted to stop watching – in fact, I couldn’t stop watching.

Watch it on Netflix.

_______________________

*My reviews of the previous seasons:

Season One

Season Two

Season Three

Miniseries Review: "Rise of Empires: Ottoman – Mehmed vs Vlad" (Netflix - 2022)

2023-01-07T13:09:00.001-08:00

The second season* of this docudrama about the Ottoman Empire focuses on the rivalry/enmity between Sultan Mehmed II** and Vlad III Dracula (also known as Vlad the Impaler), the Voivode of Wallachia, a vassal state under the Ottomans.

The two leaders had a complicated relationship spanning two decades. In 1442, when Vlad was only 12, he and younger brother Radu were sent to the court of Ottoman Sultan Murad II (Mehmed’s father and predecessor) as collateral to assure the sultan that their father – Vlad II, then Voivode – would support Ottoman policies. It was here that Vlad learned to speak fluent Turkish and studied Ottoman culture, including its military strategies and tactics. It was also the time in which he was exposed to Mehmed, who was just two years his junior.

Vlad was released in 1448 after the assassination of his father and elder brother. Although he was able to replace his father, his reign lasted only two month. It was not until 1452 that he was able to reclaim the voivodate.

At this time, Wallachia was required to pay tribute to the Sultan. In return, the Ottomans stayed out of Wallachia’s internal affairs. It was a beneficial arrangement for both sides – Vlad had a throne, and Wallachia served as a buffer to the Kingdom of Hungary, which Mehmed, who had acceded to the sultanate after the death of Murad II, regarded as a threat.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the victorious 21-year old Mehmed set his sights on expanding the Empire further into Europe.

Mehmed continued his conquests in Anatolia with its reunification and in Southeast Europe as far west as Bosnia. During this time, Vlad paid the tribute and remained on the Wallachian throne.

In 1459, Vlad stopped paying the tribute to the Sultan, considering a possible alliance with Hungary. Mehmed sent two envoys to remind Vlad of his obligations and to collect the tribute. Vlad ordered them to be impaled — his preferred method of execution.

This act of diplomatic perfidy was too much for Mehmed – he mobilized an army of as many as 150,000 troops, including the well-disciplined and highly-trained Janissaries,*** to subdue Wallachia and remove Vlad from the throne.

Without spoiling the outcome of the struggle between Mehmed and Vlad, the conflict reached its zenith during the battle for the Wallachian capital city of Târgoviște in 1462.

After the battle, Vlad left a field filled with thousands of impaled victims as a deterrent to the Ottoman forces. He remains a Romanian folk hero for his fight against the far superior Ottoman forces.

I recommend it, but suggest keeping your internet search engine of choice handy to clarify things that might not be well-known to people who do not have a background in Middle East or Central European history. I needed it as well, since I normally begin my presentations about the Middle East with the defeat of the Ottomans in World War One and the breakup of the empire shortly thereafter.

Watch it on Netflix.

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* The first season of this series dealt with Mehmed’s successful conquest of the Eastern Roman Empire capital of Constantinople in 1453, after which it was renamed Istanbul. I reviewed the first season, and highly recommend it.

** Mehmed is the Turkish rendition of Muhammad. His full title was Fatih Sultan Mehmed II (Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror).

*** The Janissary corps was originally manned by Christian youths taken from the Balkan provinces, converted to Islam, and drafted into Ottoman service. Subject to strict rules, including celibacy, the Janissaries were known particularly for their archery, but by the 16th century had also acquired rudimentary firearms.