1<!doctype html> 2<html lang="en"> 3 <head> 4 <meta charset="utf-8" /> 5 <meta name="darkreader-lock" /> 6 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" /> 7 <link rel="manifest" href="/manifest.webmanifest"> 8 <link rel="icon" href="/favicon.ico" sizes="32x32"> 9 <link rel="icon" href="/icon.svg" type="image/svg+xml"> 10 <link rel="apple-touch-icon" href="/apple-touch-icon.png"> 11 12 <link href="./_app/immutable/assets/0.B3PCwX-h.css" rel="stylesheet"><!--12qhfyh--><!----><!--1uha8ag--><!----><title>gpg.fail</title> 13 </head> 14 <body><!--[--><!--[--><!----><main class="min-w-full max-w-[1280px] my-auto bg-green-500 p-4 space-y-4"><!----><h1 class="font-bold text-2xl">Slides, pocs and patches soon!</h1> <p><span class="text-white/50">"in the hurry of leaving i forgot the sites src at home, sorry, had to rewrite the whole thing. expect a nicer site by tomorrow. im patching as we speak."</span> <br/> <span class="text-white/30">- reaper (<- to blame)</span></p> <ol class="list-decimal"><!--[--><li><a href="detached" class="text-purple hover:underline">Multiple Plaintext Attack on Detached PGP Signatures in GnuPG</a></li><li><a href="filename" class="text-purple hover:underline">GnuPG Accepts Path Separators and Path Traversals in Literal Data "Filename" Field</a></li><li><a href="formfeed" class="text-purple hover:underline">Cleartext Signature Plaintext Truncated for Hash Calculation</a></li><li><a href="malleability" class="text-purple hover:underline">Encrypted message malleability checks are incorrectly enforced causing plaintext recovery attacks</a></li><li><a href="memcpy" class="text-purple hover:underline">Memory Corruption in ASCII-Armor Parsing</a></li><li><a href="minisign" class="text-purple hover:underline">Trusted comment injection (minisign)</a></li><li><a href="notdash" class="text-purple hover:underline">Cleartext Signature Forgery in the NotDashEscaped header implementation in GnuPG</a></li><li><a href="notsoclear" class="text-purple hover:underline">OpenPGP Cleartext Signature Framework Susceptible to Format Confusion</a></li><li><a href="noverify" class="text-purple hover:underline">GnuPG Output Fails To Distinguish Signature Verification Success From Message Content</a></li><li><a href="nullbyte" class="text-purple hover:underline">Cleartext Signature Forgery in GnuPG</a></li><li><a href="polyglot" class="text-purple hover:underline">Radix64 Line-Truncation Enabling Polyglot Attacks</a></li><li><a href="sha1" class="text-purple hover:underline">GnuPG may downgrade digest algorithm to SHA1 during key signature checking</a></li><li><a href="trust" class="text-purple hover:underline">GnuPG Trust Packet Parsing Enables Adding Arbitrary Subkeys</a></li><li><a href="trustcomment" class="text-purple hover:underline">Trusted comment Injection (minisign)</a></li><!--]--></ol> <h2>VOD:</h2> <iframe width="1024" height="576" title="the talk" src="https://media.ccc.de/v/39c3-to-sign-or-not-to-sign-practical-vulnerabilities-i/oembed" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe><!----><!----></main> <footer class="bg-blue-500 p-4">contact: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection" class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b5d6dadbc1d4d6c1f5d2c5d29bd3d4dcd9">[email protected]</a></footer><!----><!--]--> <!--[!--><!--]--><!--]-->
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