embedConsentSync-D36RIyVL.js

js absolutradio.de collected 2026-10-02 06:27:02 UTC 145,516 bytes, 3,090 lines download raw bytes

1import { x as splitProps, i as getNextElement, t as template, j as spread, k as mergeProps, v as createRenderEffect, r as runHydrationEvents, z as setAttribute, e as createSignal } from './web-CqJQ5ziD.js';
2import { e as env } from './env-CTimTkDP.js';
3import { l as logger } from './logger-BHOJRl6t.js';
4
5var _tmpl$ = /* @__PURE__ */ template(`<svg width=24 height=24 viewBox="0 0 24 24"fill=none xmlns=http://www.w3.org/2000/svg><path stroke=currentColor stroke-width=1.5 stroke-linecap=round stroke-linejoin=round>`);
6const PATHS = {
7  left: "M6.75 15.75L3 12M3 12L6.75 8.25M3 12H21",
8  right: "M17.25 8.25L21 12M21 12L17.25 15.75M21 12H3"
9};
10function ArrowIcon(props) {
11  const [local, others] = splitProps(props, ["class", "classList", "direction"]);
12  const direction = () => local.direction ?? "right";
13  const path = () => PATHS[direction()];
14  return (() => {
15    var _el$ = getNextElement(_tmpl$), _el$2 = _el$.firstChild;
16    spread(_el$, mergeProps({
17      get ["class"]() {
18        return local.class;
19      },
20      get classList() {
21        return local.classList;
22      }
23    }, others), true, true);
24    createRenderEffect(() => setAttribute(_el$2, "d", path()));
25    runHydrationEvents();
26    return _el$;
27  })();
28}
29
30function hasFiniteDuration(duration) {
31  return duration !== void 0 && isFinite(duration) && duration > 0;
32}
33function formatTime(seconds) {
34  if (!isFinite(seconds)) return "0:00";
35  const mins = Math.floor(seconds / 60);
36  const secs = Math.floor(seconds % 60);
37  const paddedSecs = secs < 10 ? "0" + secs : secs;
38  return `${mins}:${paddedSecs}`;
39}
40function resolveMediaUrl(media) {
41  if (!media) return null;

42  if (typeof media === "number") return null;
43  if (typeof media === "string") {
44    if (media.startsWith("http")) return media;
45    return `${env.cmsApiUrl}${media}`;
46  }
47  const url = media.url;
48  if (!url) return null;
49  if (url.startsWith("http")) return url;
50  return `${env.cmsApiUrl}${url}`;
51}
52function resolveOgImage(media) {
53  if (!media || typeof media === "number" || typeof media === "string") {
54    return resolveMedia(media);
55  }
56  const og = "sizes" in media ? media.sizes?.og : void 0;
57  if (og?.url) {
58    return {
59      url: og.url.startsWith("http") ? og.url : `${env.cmsApiUrl}${og.url}`,
60      width: og.width ?? void 0,
61      height: og.height ?? void 0,
62      alt: media.alt || void 0
63    };
64  }
65  return resolveMedia(media);
66}
67function resolveMedia(media) {
68  if (!media) return null;
69  if (typeof media === "number") return null;
70  let url = null;
71  let width;
72  let height;
73  let alt;
74  if (typeof media === "string") {
75    url = media;
76  } else {
77    url = media.url;
78    width = media.width;
79    height = media.height;
80    alt = media.alt || void 0;
81  }
82  if (!url) return null;
83  if (!url.startsWith("http")) {
84    url = `${env.cmsApiUrl}${url}`;
85  }
86  return {
87    url,
88    width,
89    height,
90    alt
91  };
92}
93function getTcfConsentString() {
94  if (typeof window === "undefined") return "usercentrics_not_implemented";
95  try {
96    const tcString = window.__ucCmp?.cmpController?.consent?.tcString;
97    return typeof tcString === "string" && tcString ? tcString : "null";
98  } catch {
99    return "usercentrics_not_implemented";
100  }
101}
102const appendParamsToMediaUrl = (url) => {
103  if (!url) return url;
104  const parsed = new URL(url);
105  parsed.searchParams.set("t", String(Date.now()));
106  const defaults = {
107    aggregator: "website",
108    companionAds: "false",
109    "aw_0_1st.playerId": "website-player",
110    "aw_0_req.userConsentV2": getTcfConsentString()
111  };
112  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(defaults)) {
113    if (!parsed.searchParams.has(key)) {
114      parsed.searchParams.set(key, value);
115    }
116  }
117  const finalUrl = parsed.toString();
118  return finalUrl;
119};
120
121/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.15 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.15

vendor: 9,549 bytes, lines 121-415

121/LICENSE */
122
123function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
124  (null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
125  for (var e = 0, n = Array(a); e < a; e++) n[e] = r[e];
126  return n;
127}
128function _arrayWithHoles(r) {
129  if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;
130}
131function _iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
132  var t = null == r ? null : "undefined" != typeof Symbol && r[Symbol.iterator] || r["@@iterator"];
133  if (null != t) {
134    var e,
135      n,
136      i,
137      u,
138      a = [],
139      f = true,
140      o = false;
141    try {
142      if (i = (t = t.call(r)).next, 0 === l) ; else for (; !(f = (e = i.call(t)).done) && (a.push(e.value), a.length !== l); f = !0);
143    } catch (r) {
144      o = true, n = r;
145    } finally {
146      try {
147        if (!f && null != t.return && (u = t.return(), Object(u) !== u)) return;
148      } finally {
149        if (o) throw n;
150      }
151    }
152    return a;
153  }
154}
155function _nonIterableRest() {
156  throw new TypeError("Invalid attempt to destructure non-iterable instance.\nIn order to be iterable, non-array objects must have a [Symbol.iterator]() method.");
157}
158function _slicedToArray(r, e) {
159  return _arrayWithHoles(r) || _iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || _nonIterableRest();
160}
161function _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
162  if (r) {
163    if ("string" == typeof r) return _arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
164    var t = {}.toString.call(r).slice(8, -1);
165    return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
166  }
167}
168
169const entries = Object.entries,
170  setPrototypeOf = Object.setPrototypeOf,
171  isFrozen = Object.isFrozen,
172  getPrototypeOf = Object.getPrototypeOf,
173  getOwnPropertyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
174let freeze = Object.freeze,
175  seal = Object.seal,
176  create = Object.create; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
177let _ref = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect,
178  apply = _ref.apply,
179  construct = _ref.construct;
180if (!freeze) {
181  freeze = function freeze(x) {
182    return x;
183  };
184}
185if (!seal) {
186  seal = function seal(x) {
187    return x;
188  };
189}
190if (!apply) {
191  apply = function apply(func, thisArg) {
192    for (var _len = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len > 2 ? _len - 2 : 0), _key = 2; _key < _len; _key++) {
193      args[_key - 2] = arguments[_key];
194    }
195    return func.apply(thisArg, args);
196  };
197}
198if (!construct) {
199  construct = function construct(Func) {
200    for (var _len2 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len2 > 1 ? _len2 - 1 : 0), _key2 = 1; _key2 < _len2; _key2++) {
201      args[_key2 - 1] = arguments[_key2];
202    }
203    return new Func(...args);
204  };
205}
206const arrayForEach = unapply(Array.prototype.forEach);
207const arrayLastIndexOf = unapply(Array.prototype.lastIndexOf);
208const arrayPop = unapply(Array.prototype.pop);
209const arrayPush = unapply(Array.prototype.push);
210const arraySplice = unapply(Array.prototype.splice);
211const arrayIsArray = Array.isArray;
212const stringToLowerCase = unapply(String.prototype.toLowerCase);
213const stringToString = unapply(String.prototype.toString);
214const stringMatch = unapply(String.prototype.match);
215const stringReplace = unapply(String.prototype.replace);
216const stringIndexOf = unapply(String.prototype.indexOf);
217const stringTrim = unapply(String.prototype.trim);
218const numberToString = unapply(Number.prototype.toString);
219const booleanToString = unapply(Boolean.prototype.toString);
220const bigintToString = typeof BigInt === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(BigInt.prototype.toString);
221const symbolToString = typeof Symbol === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(Symbol.prototype.toString);
222const objectHasOwnProperty = unapply(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty);
223const objectToString = unapply(Object.prototype.toString);
224const regExpTest = unapply(RegExp.prototype.test);
225const typeErrorCreate = unconstruct(TypeError);
226/**
227 * Creates a new function that calls the given function with a specified thisArg and arguments.
228 *
229 * @param func - The function to be wrapped and called.
230 * @returns A new function that calls the given function with a specified thisArg and arguments.
231 */
232function unapply(func) {
233  return function (thisArg) {
234    if (thisArg instanceof RegExp) {
235      thisArg.lastIndex = 0;
236    }
237    for (var _len3 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len3 > 1 ? _len3 - 1 : 0), _key3 = 1; _key3 < _len3; _key3++) {
238      args[_key3 - 1] = arguments[_key3];
239    }
240    return apply(func, thisArg, args);
241  };
242}
243/**
244 * Creates a new function that constructs an instance of the given constructor function with the provided arguments.
245 *
246 * @param func - The constructor function to be wrapped and called.
247 * @returns A new function that constructs an instance of the given constructor function with the provided arguments.
248 */
249function unconstruct(Func) {
250  return function () {
251    for (var _len4 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len4), _key4 = 0; _key4 < _len4; _key4++) {
252      args[_key4] = arguments[_key4];
253    }
254    return construct(Func, args);
255  };
256}
257/**
258 * Add properties to a lookup table
259 *
260 * @param set - The set to which elements will be added.
261 * @param array - The array containing elements to be added to the set.
262 * @param transformCaseFunc - An optional function to transform the case of each element before adding to the set.
263 * @returns The modified set with added elements.
264 */
265function addToSet(set, array) {
266  let transformCaseFunc = arguments.length > 2 && arguments[2] !== undefined ? arguments[2] : stringToLowerCase;
267  if (setPrototypeOf) {
268    // Make 'in' and truthy checks like Boolean(set.constructor)
269    // independent of any properties defined on Object.prototype.
270    // Prevent prototype setters from intercepting set as a this value.
271    setPrototypeOf(set, null);
272  }
273  if (!arrayIsArray(array)) {
274    return set;
275  }
276  let l = array.length;
277  while (l--) {
278    let element = array[l];
279    if (typeof element === 'string') {
280      const lcElement = transformCaseFunc(element);
281      if (lcElement !== element) {
282        // Config presets (e.g. tags.js, attrs.js) are immutable.
283        if (!isFrozen(array)) {
284          array[l] = lcElement;
285        }
286        element = lcElement;
287      }
288    }
289    set[element] = true;
290  }
291  return set;
292}
293/**
294 * Clean up an array to harden against CSPP
295 *
296 * @param array - The array to be cleaned.
297 * @returns The cleaned version of the array
298 */
299function cleanArray(array) {
300  for (let index = 0; index < array.length; index++) {
301    const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(array, index);
302    if (!isPropertyExist) {
303      array[index] = null;
304    }
305  }
306  return array;
307}
308/**
309 * Shallow clone an object
310 *
311 * @param object - The object to be cloned.
312 * @returns A new object that copies the original.
313 */
314function clone(object) {
315  const newObject = create(null);
316  for (const _ref2 of entries(object)) {
317    var _ref3 = _slicedToArray(_ref2, 2);
318    const property = _ref3[0];
319    const value = _ref3[1];
320    const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(object, property);
321    if (isPropertyExist) {
322      if (arrayIsArray(value)) {
323        newObject[property] = cleanArray(value);
324      } else if (value && typeof value === 'object' && value.constructor === Object) {
325        newObject[property] = clone(value);
326      } else {
327        newObject[property] = value;
328      }
329    }
330  }
331  return newObject;
332}
333/**
334 * Convert non-node values into strings without depending on direct property access.
335 *
336 * @param value - The value to stringify.
337 * @returns A string representation of the provided value.
338 */
339function stringifyValue(value) {
340  switch (typeof value) {
341    case 'string':
342      {
343        return value;
344      }
345    case 'number':
346      {
347        return numberToString(value);
348      }
349    case 'boolean':
350      {
351        return booleanToString(value);
352      }
353    case 'bigint':
354      {
355        return bigintToString ? bigintToString(value) : '0';
356      }
357    case 'symbol':
358      {
359        return symbolToString ? symbolToString(value) : 'Symbol()';
360      }
361    case 'undefined':
362      {
363        return objectToString(value);
364      }
365    case 'function':
366    case 'object':
367      {
368        if (value === null) {
369          return objectToString(value);
370        }
371        const valueAsRecord = value;
372        const valueToString = lookupGetter(valueAsRecord, 'toString');
373        if (typeof valueToString === 'function') {
374          const stringified = valueToString(valueAsRecord);
375          return typeof stringified === 'string' ? stringified : objectToString(stringified);
376        }
377        return objectToString(value);
378      }
379    default:
380      {
381        return objectToString(value);
382      }
383  }
384}
385/**
386 * This method automatically checks if the prop is function or getter and behaves accordingly.
387 *
388 * @param object - The object to look up the getter function in its prototype chain.
389 * @param prop - The property name for which to find the getter function.
390 * @returns The getter function found in the prototype chain or a fallback function.
391 */
392function lookupGetter(object, prop) {
393  while (object !== null) {
394    const desc = getOwnPropertyDescriptor(object, prop);
395    if (desc) {
396      if (desc.get) {
397        return unapply(desc.get);
398      }
399      if (typeof desc.value === 'function') {
400        return unapply(desc.value);
401      }
402    }
403    object = getPrototypeOf(object);
404  }
405  function fallbackValue() {
406    return null;
407  }
408  return fallbackValue;
409}
410function isRegex(value) {
411  try {
412    regExpTest(value, '');
413    return true;
414  } catch (_unused) {
415    return false;

vendor: 9,004 bytes, lines 416-461

416  }
417}
418
419const html$1 = freeze(['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 'big', 'blink', 'blockquote', 'body', 'br', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'center', 'cite', 'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'content', 'data', 'datalist', 'dd', 'decorator', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'dialog', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'element', 'em', 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'font', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'head', 'header', 'hgroup', 'hr', 'html', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'marquee', 'menu', 'menuitem', 'meter', 'nav', 'nobr', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'search', 'section', 'select', 'shadow', 'slot', 'small', 'source', 'spacer', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'style', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'template', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'track', 'tt', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video', 'wbr']);
420const svg$1 = freeze(['svg', 'a', 'altglyph', 'altglyphdef', 'altglyphitem', 'animatecolor', 'animatemotion', 'animatetransform', 'circle', 'clippath', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'filter', 'font', 'g', 'glyph', 'glyphref', 'hkern', 'image', 'inputmode', 'line', 'lineargradient', 'marker', 'mask', 'metadata', 'mpath', 'part', 'path', 'pattern', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialgradient', 'rect', 'stop', 'style', 'switch', 'symbol', 'text', 'textpath', 'title', 'tref', 'tspan', 'view', 'vkern']);
421const svgFilters = freeze(['feBlend', 'feColorMatrix', 'feComponentTransfer', 'feComposite', 'feConvolveMatrix', 'feDiffuseLighting', 'feDisplacementMap', 'feDistantLight', 'feDropShadow', 'feFlood', 'feFuncA', 'feFuncB', 'feFuncG', 'feFuncR', 'feGaussianBlur', 'feImage', 'feMerge', 'feMergeNode', 'feMorphology', 'feOffset', 'fePointLight', 'feSpecularLighting', 'feSpotLight', 'feTile', 'feTurbulence']);
422// List of SVG elements that are disallowed by default.
423// We still need to know them so that we can do namespace
424// checks properly in case one wants to add them to
425// allow-list.
426const svgDisallowed = freeze(['animate', 'color-profile', 'cursor', 'discard', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'foreignobject', 'hatch', 'hatchpath', 'mesh', 'meshgradient', 'meshpatch', 'meshrow', 'missing-glyph', 'script', 'set', 'solidcolor', 'unknown', 'use']);
427const mathMl$1 = freeze(['math', 'menclose', 'merror', 'mfenced', 'mfrac', 'mglyph', 'mi', 'mlabeledtr', 'mmultiscripts', 'mn', 'mo', 'mover', 'mpadded', 'mphantom', 'mroot', 'mrow', 'ms', 'mspace', 'msqrt', 'mstyle', 'msub', 'msup', 'msubsup', 'mtable', 'mtd', 'mtext', 'mtr', 'munder', 'munderover', 'mprescripts']);
428// Similarly to SVG, we want to know all MathML elements,
429// even those that we disallow by default.
430const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongdiv', 'mscarries', 'mscarry', 'msgroup', 'mstack', 'msline', 'msrow', 'semantics', 'annotation', 'annotation-xml', 'mprescripts', 'none']);
431const text = freeze(['#text']);
432
433const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
434const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'pointer-events', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'vector-effect', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
435const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
436const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
437
438const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/{{[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*}}/g);
439const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*%>/g);
440const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\${[\w\W]*/g);
441const DATA_ATTR = seal(/^data-[\-\w.\u00B7-\uFFFF]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
442const ARIA_ATTR = seal(/^aria-[\-\w]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
443const IS_ALLOWED_URI = seal(/^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|sms|cid|xmpp|matrix):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
444);
445const IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = seal(/^(?:\w+script|data):/i);
446const ATTR_WHITESPACE = seal(/[\u0000-\u0020\u00A0\u1680\u180E\u2000-\u2029\u205F\u3000]/g // eslint-disable-line no-control-regex
447);
448const DOCTYPE_NAME = seal(/^html$/i);
449const CUSTOM_ELEMENT = seal(/^[a-z][.\w]*(-[.\w]+)+$/i);
450// Markup-significant character probes used by _sanitizeElements.
451// Shared module-level instances are safe despite the sticky /g flags:
452// unapply() resets lastIndex for RegExp receivers before every call.
453const ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w!]/g);
454const COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w]/g);
455const FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE = seal(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i);
456const SELF_CLOSING_TAG = seal(/\/>/i);
457
458// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
459const NODE_TYPE = {
460  element: 1,
461

vendor: 8,671 bytes, lines 461-640

461attribute: 2,
462  text: 3,
463  cdataSection: 4,
464  entityReference: 5,
465  // Deprecated
466  entityNode: 6,
467  // Deprecated
468  processingInstruction: 7,
469  comment: 8,
470  document: 9,
471  documentType: 10,
472  documentFragment: 11,
473  notation: 12 // Deprecated
474};
475/* HTML-namespace elements whose child text nodes are serialized *literally*
476   (unescaped) by the HTML fragment-serialization algorithm. Two reparse-mXSS
477   shapes ride on that literal serialization:
478     (a) an element child - a tree the HTML parser can never build, but the DOM
479         API and an XML/XHTML parse can - after which a `</tag>`-bearing text
480         sibling breaks the element open on reparse; and
481     (b) text-only content that already carries the element's OWN end tag, e.g.
482         `<style>...</style><img onerror=x>` built as a node, which the literal
483         serializer emits verbatim for the HTML parser to re-open.
484   Shape (a) is handled by the firstElementChild branch in _isUnsafeNode; shape
485   (b) by the LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE probe. Both read textContent (the raw-serialized
486   form for these elements) rather than innerHTML, because an XML/XHTML working
487   document serializes innerHTML with `<` escaped, which silently blinds the
488   innerHTML-based probes (rule 1's second probe and FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE) there.
489   `script` is never allow-listed, but is kept here so the guard matches the
490   serializer's own literal-text list exactly. */
491const LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES = ['style', 'script', 'xmp', 'iframe', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'plaintext', 'noscript'];
492const LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS = freeze(addToSet({}, LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES));
493/* Per-element end-tag matcher. On an HTML reparse the ONLY token that
494   terminates a literal-text element's raw content is its own end tag; a foreign
495   literal-text close (e.g. `</xmp>` sitting inside `<style>`) does not break
496   out, so matching is per-element, not a shared alternation. The lookahead
497   requires an HTML tag-name terminator (whitespace, `/` or `>`) so a longer
498   name such as `</styles` is not mistaken for `</style`. */
499const LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE = function () {
500  const map = {};
501  arrayForEach(LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES, name => {
502    map[name] = seal(new RegExp('</' + name + '(?=[\\t\\n\\f\\r />])', 'i'));
503  });
504  return freeze(map);
505}();
506const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
507  return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
508};
509/**
510 * Creates a no-op policy for internal use only.
511 * Don't export this function outside this module!
512 * @param trustedTypes The policy factory.
513 * @param purifyHostElement The Script element used to load DOMPurify (to determine policy name suffix).
514 * @return The policy created (or null, if Trusted Types
515 * are not supported or creating the policy failed).
516 */
517const _createTrustedTypesPolicy = function _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, purifyHostElement) {
518  if (typeof trustedTypes !== 'object' || typeof trustedTypes.createPolicy !== 'function') {
519    return null;
520  }
521  // Allow the callers to control the unique policy name
522  // by adding a data-tt-policy-suffix to the script element with the DOMPurify.
523  // Policy creation with duplicate names throws in Trusted Types.
524  let suffix = null;
525  const ATTR_NAME = 'data-tt-policy-suffix';
526  if (purifyHostElement && purifyHostElement.hasAttribute(ATTR_NAME)) {
527    suffix = purifyHostElement.getAttribute(ATTR_NAME);
528  }
529  const policyName = 'dompurify' + (suffix ? '#' + suffix : '');
530  try {
531    return trustedTypes.createPolicy(policyName, {
532      createHTML(html) {
533        return html;
534      },
535      createScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
536        return scriptUrl;
537      }
538    });
539  } catch (_) {
540    // Policy creation failed (most likely another DOMPurify script has
541    // already run). Skip creating the policy, as this will only cause errors
542    // if TT are enforced.
543    console.warn('TrustedTypes policy ' + policyName + ' could not be created.');
544    return null;
545  }
546};
547const _createHooksMap = function _createHooksMap() {
548  return {
549    afterSanitizeAttributes: [],
550    afterSanitizeElements: [],
551    afterSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
552    beforeSanitizeAttributes: [],
553    beforeSanitizeElements: [],
554    beforeSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
555    uponSanitizeAttribute: [],
556    uponSanitizeElement: [],
557    uponSanitizeShadowNode: []
558  };
559};
560/**
561 * Resolve a set-valued configuration option: a fresh set built from
562 * cfg[key] when it is an own array property (seeded with a clone of
563 * options.base when given, case-normalized via options.transform),
564 * the fallback set otherwise.
565 *
566 * @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
567 * @param key the configuration property to read
568 * @param fallback the set to use when the option is absent or not an array
569 * @param options transform and optional base set to merge into
570 * @returns the resolved set
571 */
572const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options) {
573  return objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) && arrayIsArray(cfg[key]) ? addToSet(options.base ? clone(options.base) : {}, cfg[key], options.transform) : fallback;
574};
575/**
576 * Resolve an object-valued configuration option: a prototype-free clone
577 * of cfg[key] when it is an own, truthy object property, else a fresh
578 * fallback built by makeFallback (fresh on every parse, so a previous
579 * parse can never leak state into the next one).
580 *
581 * @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
582 * @param key the configuration property to read
583 * @param makeFallback builds the fallback value when the option is absent
584 * @returns the resolved object
585 */
586const _resolveObjectOption = function _resolveObjectOption(cfg, key, makeFallback) {
587  const value = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) ? cfg[key] : undefined;
588  return value && typeof value === 'object' ? clone(value) : makeFallback();
589};
590function createDOMPurify() {
591  let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
592  const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
593  DOMPurify.version = '3.4.15';
594  DOMPurify.removed = [];
595  if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
596    // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
597    // so that you can pass your own Window
598    DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
599    return DOMPurify;
600  }
601  let document = window.document;
602  const originalDocument = document;
603  const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
604  window.DocumentFragment;
605    const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
606    Node = window.Node,
607    Element = window.Element,
608    NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
609    _window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap;
610    _window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap;
611    window.HTMLFormElement;
612    const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
613    trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
614  const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
615  const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
616  const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
617  // Clobber-safe Attr-node removal. On an HTMLFormElement a descendant named
618  // "removeAttributeNode" shadows the prototype method via
619  // [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so element.removeAttributeNode(attr) throws.
620  // Calling the cached Element.prototype method with the element as the
621  // receiver removes the exact live Attr node regardless of the shadowing.
622  const removeAttributeNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'removeAttributeNode');
623  const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
624  const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
625  const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
626  const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
627  const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
628  const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
629  const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
630  const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
631  /* Clobber-safe nodeType / nodeName reads through the cached Node.prototype
632     getters, with a direct-property fallback for environments that lack
633     Node.prototype. Sites that need a different fallback (e.g. _isClobbered
634     returns early on a null name) intentionally keep their own reads. */
635  const _readNodeType = function _readNodeType(node) {
636    return getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
637  };
638  const _readNodeName = function _readNodeName(node) {
639    return getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName;
640  }

vendor: 13,881 bytes, lines 640-924

640;
641  // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
642  // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
643  // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
644  // a new empty registry is used when creating a template contents owner
645  // document, so we use that as our parent document to ensure nothing
646  // is inherited.
647  if (typeof HTMLTemplateElement === 'function') {
648    const template = document.createElement('template');
649    if (template.content && template.content.ownerDocument) {
650      document = template.content.ownerDocument;
651    }
652  }
653  let trustedTypesPolicy;
654  let emptyHTML = '';
655  // The instance's own internal Trusted Types policy. Unlike a caller-supplied
656  // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY`, this is created at most once â Trusted Types throws
657  // on duplicate policy names â and is the only policy allowed to persist
658  // across configurations and survive `clearConfig()`.
659  let defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
660  let defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = false;
661  // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
662  // policy (`createHTML` or `createScriptURL`). If a supplied policy callback
663  // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
664  // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
665  // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead. The guard is shared
666  // across both callbacks, because either one re-entering `sanitize` triggers
667  // the same unbounded recursion.
668  let IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY = 0;
669  const _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy = function _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy() {
670    if (IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY > 0) {
671      throw typeErrorCreate('A configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY callback (createHTML or ' + 'createScriptURL) must not call DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes ' + 'infinite recursion. Do not pass a policy whose callbacks wrap ' + 'DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; see the "DOMPurify and Trusted ' + 'Types" section of the README.');
672    }
673  };
674  const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
675    _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
676    IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
677    try {
678      return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
679    } finally {
680      IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
681    }
682  };
683  const _createTrustedScriptURL = function _createTrustedScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
684    _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
685    IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
686    try {
687      return trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(scriptUrl);
688    } finally {
689      IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
690    }
691  };
692  // Lazily resolve (and cache) the instance's internal default policy.
693  // Resolution is attempted at most once: a successful `createPolicy` cannot be
694  // repeated (Trusted Types throws on duplicate names), and a failed or
695  // unsupported attempt must not be retried on every parse.
696  const _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy = function _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy() {
697    if (!defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved) {
698      defaultTrustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
699      defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = true;
700    }
701    return defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
702  };
703  const _document = document,
704    implementation = _document.implementation,
705    createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
706    createDocumentFragment = _document.createDocumentFragment,
707    getElementsByTagName = _document.getElementsByTagName;
708  const importNode = originalDocument.importNode;
709  let hooks = _createHooksMap();
710  /**
711   * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
712   */
713  DOMPurify.isSupported = typeof entries === 'function' && typeof getParentNode === 'function' && implementation && implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;
714  const MUSTACHE_EXPR$1 = MUSTACHE_EXPR,
715    ERB_EXPR$1 = ERB_EXPR,
716    TMPLIT_EXPR$1 = TMPLIT_EXPR,
717    DATA_ATTR$1 = DATA_ATTR,
718    ARIA_ATTR$1 = ARIA_ATTR,
719    IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1 = IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
720    ATTR_WHITESPACE$1 = ATTR_WHITESPACE,
721    CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1 = CUSTOM_ELEMENT;
722  let IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = IS_ALLOWED_URI;
723  /**
724   * We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
725   * don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
726   */
727  /* allowed element names */
728  let ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
729  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...html$1, ...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...mathMl$1, ...text]);
730  /* Allowed attribute names */
731  let ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
732  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR = addToSet({}, [...html, ...svg, ...mathMl, ...xml]);
733  /*
734   * Configure how DOMPurify should handle custom elements and their attributes as well as customized built-in elements.
735   * @property {RegExp|Function|null} tagNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any custom elements)
736   * @property {RegExp|Function|null} attributeNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any attributes not on the allow list)
737   * @property {boolean} allowCustomizedBuiltInElements allow custom elements derived from built-ins if they pass CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck. Default: `false`.
738   */
739  let CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(create(null, {
740    tagNameCheck: {
741      writable: true,
742      configurable: false,
743      enumerable: true,
744      value: null
745    },
746    attributeNameCheck: {
747      writable: true,
748      configurable: false,
749      enumerable: true,
750      value: null
751    },
752    allowCustomizedBuiltInElements: {
753      writable: true,
754      configurable: false,
755      enumerable: true,
756      value: false
757    }
758  }));
759  /* Explicitly forbidden tags (overrides ALLOWED_TAGS/ADD_TAGS) */
760  let FORBID_TAGS = null;
761  /* Explicitly forbidden attributes (overrides ALLOWED_ATTR/ADD_ATTR) */
762  let FORBID_ATTR = null;
763  /* Config object to store ADD_TAGS/ADD_ATTR functions (when used as functions) */
764  const EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(create(null, {
765    tagCheck: {
766      writable: true,
767      configurable: false,
768      enumerable: true,
769      value: null
770    },
771    attributeCheck: {
772      writable: true,
773      configurable: false,
774      enumerable: true,
775      value: null
776    }
777  }));
778  /* Decide if ARIA attributes are okay */
779  let ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = true;
780  /* Decide if custom data attributes are okay */
781  let ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = true;
782  /* Decide if unknown protocols are okay */
783  let ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = false;
784  /* Decide if self-closing tags in attributes are allowed.
785   * Usually removed due to a mXSS issue in jQuery 3.0 */
786  let ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = true;
787  /* Output should be safe for common template engines.
788   * This means, DOMPurify removes data attributes, mustaches and ERB
789   */
790  let SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = false;
791  /* Output should be safe even for XML used within HTML and alike.
792   * This means, DOMPurify removes comments when containing risky content.
793   */
794  let SAFE_FOR_XML = true;
795  /* Decide if document with <html>... should be returned */
796  let WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;
797  /* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */
798  let SET_CONFIG = false;
799  /* Pristine allowlist bindings captured at setConfig() time. On the
800   * persistent-config path sanitize() restores the sets from these before
801   * the per-walk hook clone-guard, so a hook's in-call widening cannot
802   * carry across calls. Null until setConfig() is called; reset by
803   * clearConfig(). */
804  let SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
805  let SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
806  /* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of
807   * document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */
808  let FORCE_BODY = false;
809  /* Decide if a DOM `HTMLBodyElement` should be returned, instead of a html
810   * string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported).
811   * If `WHOLE_DOCUMENT` is enabled a `HTMLHtmlElement` will be returned instead
812   */
813  let RETURN_DOM = false;
814  /* Decide if a DOM `DocumentFragment` should be returned, instead of a html
815   * string  (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported) */
816  let RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = false;
817  /* Try to return a Trusted Type object instead of a string, return a string in
818   * case Trusted Types are not supported  */
819  let RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = false;
820  /* Output should be free from DOM clobbering attacks?
821   * This sanitizes markups named with colliding, clobberable built-in DOM APIs.
822   */
823  let SANITIZE_DOM = true;
824  /* Achieve full DOM Clobbering protection by isolating the namespace of named
825   * properties and JS variables, mitigating attacks that abuse the HTML/DOM spec rules.
826   *
827   * HTML/DOM spec rules that enable DOM Clobbering:
828   *   - Named Access on Window (Â§7.3.3)
829   *   - DOM Tree Accessors (Â§3.1.5)
830   *   - Form Element Parent-Child Relations (Â§4.10.3)
831   *   - Iframe srcdoc / Nested WindowProxies (Â§4.8.5)
832   *   - HTMLCollection (Â§4.2.10.2)
833   *
834   * Namespace isolation is implemented by prefixing `id` and `name` attributes
835   * with a constant string, i.e., `user-content-`
836   */
837  let SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = false;
838  const SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX = 'user-content-';
839  /* Keep element content when removing element? */
840  let KEEP_CONTENT = true;
841  /* If a `Node` is passed to sanitize(), then performs sanitization in-place instead
842   * of importing it into a new Document and returning a sanitized copy */
843  let IN_PLACE = false;
844  /* Allow usage of profiles like html, svg and mathMl */
845  let USE_PROFILES = {};
846  /* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
847  let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
848  const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script',
849  // <selectedcontent> mirrors the selected <option>'s subtree, cloned by
850  // the UA (customizable <select>) â including any on* handlers â and the
851  // engine re-mirrors synchronously whenever a removal changes which
852  // option/selectedcontent is current, even inside DOMPurify's inert
853  // DOMParser document. Hoisting its children on removal re-inserts a fresh
854  // mirror target ahead of the walk, which the engine refills, looping
855  // forever (DoS) and amplifying output. Dropping its content on removal
856  // (rather than hoisting) breaks that cascade; the content is a duplicate
857  // of the option, which is sanitized on its own. See campaign-3 F1/F6.
858  'selectedcontent', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
859  /* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
860  let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
861  const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'video', 'img', 'source', 'image', 'track']);
862  /* Attributes safe for values like "javascript:" */
863  let URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = null;
864  const DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = addToSet({}, ['alt', 'class', 'for', 'id', 'label', 'name', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'role', 'summary', 'title', 'value', 'style', 'xmlns']);
865  const MATHML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML';
866  const SVG_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg';
867  const HTML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml';
868  /* Document namespace */
869  let NAMESPACE = HTML_NAMESPACE;
870  let IS_EMPTY_INPUT = false;
871  /* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
872  let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
873  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet({}, [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE], stringToString);
874  const DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
875  let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
876  const DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['annotation-xml']);
877  let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
878  // Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
879  // namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
880  // so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
881  // HTML namespace.
882  const COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS = addToSet({}, ['title', 'style', 'font', 'a', 'script']);
883  /* Parsing of strict XHTML documents */
884  let PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = null;
885  const SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES = ['application/xhtml+xml', 'text/html'];
886  const DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = 'text/html';
887  let transformCaseFunc = null;
888  /* Keep a reference to config to pass to hooks */
889  let CONFIG = null;
890  /* Ideally, do not touch anything below this line */
891  /* ______________________________________________ */
892  const formElement = document.createElement('form');
893  const isRegexOrFunction = function isRegexOrFunction(testValue) {
894    return testValue instanceof RegExp || testValue instanceof Function;
895  };
896  /**
897   * _parseConfig
898   *
899   * @param cfg optional config literal
900   */
901  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
902  const _parseConfig = function _parseConfig() {
903    let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
904    if (CONFIG && CONFIG === cfg) {
905      return;
906    }
907    /* Shield configuration object from tampering */
908    if (!cfg || typeof cfg !== 'object') {
909      cfg = {};
910    }
911    /* Shield configuration object from prototype pollution */
912    cfg = clone(cfg);
913    PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE =
914    // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
915    SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES.indexOf(cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE) === -1 ? DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE : cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE;
916    // HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
917    transformCaseFunc = PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' ? stringToString : stringToLowerCase;
918    /* Set configuration parameters */
919    ALLOWED_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, {
920      transform: transformCaseFunc
921    });
922    ALLOWED_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, {
923      transform: transformCaseFunc
924    });

vendor: 12,903 bytes, lines 925-1182

925    ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, {
926      transform: stringToString
927    });
928    URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR', DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, {
929      transform: transformCaseFunc,
930      base: DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES
931    });
932    DATA_URI_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS', DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS, {
933      transform: transformCaseFunc,
934      base: DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS
935    });
936    FORBID_CONTENTS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS', DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS, {
937      transform: transformCaseFunc
938    });
939    FORBID_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS', clone({}), {
940      transform: transformCaseFunc
941    });
942    FORBID_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR', clone({}), {
943      transform: transformCaseFunc
944    });
945    USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object' ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES) : cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
946    ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
947    ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
948    ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
949    ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR !== false; // Default true
950    SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = cfg.SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES || false; // Default false
951    SAFE_FOR_XML = cfg.SAFE_FOR_XML !== false; // Default true
952    WHOLE_DOCUMENT = cfg.WHOLE_DOCUMENT || false; // Default false
953    RETURN_DOM = cfg.RETURN_DOM || false; // Default false
954    RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT || false; // Default false
955    RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = cfg.RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE || false; // Default false
956    FORCE_BODY = cfg.FORCE_BODY || false; // Default false
957    SANITIZE_DOM = cfg.SANITIZE_DOM !== false; // Default true
958    SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
959    KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
960    IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
961    IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
962    NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
963    MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS', () => addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) // Default built-in map
964    );
965    HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS', () => addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) // Default built-in map
966    );
967    const customElementHandling = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING', () => create(null));
968    CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
969    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
970      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
971    }
972    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'attributeNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck)) {
973      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck; // Default undefined
974    }
975    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements') && typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
976      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
977    }
978    seal(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING);
979    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
980      ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
981    }
982    if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
983      RETURN_DOM = true;
984    }
985    /* Parse profile info */
986    if (USE_PROFILES) {
987      ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, text);
988      ALLOWED_ATTR = create(null);
989      if (USE_PROFILES.html === true) {
990        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, html$1);
991        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, html);
992      }
993      if (USE_PROFILES.svg === true) {
994        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svg$1);
995        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg);
996        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
997      }
998      if (USE_PROFILES.svgFilters === true) {
999        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svgFilters);
1000        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg);
1001        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
1002      }
1003      if (USE_PROFILES.mathMl === true) {
1004        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, mathMl$1);
1005        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, mathMl);
1006        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
1007      }
1008    }
1009    /* Always reset function-based ADD_TAGS / ADD_ATTR checks to prevent
1010     * leaking across calls when switching from function to array config */
1011    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
1012    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
1013    /* Merge configuration parameters */
1014    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
1015      if (typeof cfg.ADD_TAGS === 'function') {
1016        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = cfg.ADD_TAGS;
1017      } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_TAGS)) {
1018        if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
1019          ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
1020        }
1021        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
1022      }
1023    }
1024    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
1025      if (typeof cfg.ADD_ATTR === 'function') {
1026        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = cfg.ADD_ATTR;
1027      } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_ATTR)) {
1028        if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
1029          ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
1030        }
1031        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
1032      }
1033    }
1034    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
1035      if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
1036        FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
1037      }
1038      addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
1039    }
1040    /* Add #text in case KEEP_CONTENT is set to true */
1041    if (KEEP_CONTENT) {
1042      ALLOWED_TAGS['#text'] = true;
1043    }
1044    /* Add html, head and body to ALLOWED_TAGS in case WHOLE_DOCUMENT is true */
1045    if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT) {
1046      addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['html', 'head', 'body']);
1047    }
1048    /* Add tbody to ALLOWED_TAGS in case tables are permitted, see #286, #365 */
1049    if (ALLOWED_TAGS.table) {
1050      addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
1051      delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
1052    }
1053    // Re-derive the active Trusted Types policy from this configuration on
1054    // every parse. The active policy must never be sticky closure state that
1055    // outlives the config that set it: a caller-supplied policy left in place
1056    // after `clearConfig()` â or after a later call that supplied none, or
1057    // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` â could sign a subsequent "default"
1058    // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` result with a foreign, possibly unsafe policy.
1059    // See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
1060    if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
1061      if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
1062        throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.');
1063      }
1064      if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
1065        throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
1066      }
1067      // A caller-supplied policy applies to this configuration only.
1068      const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
1069      trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
1070      // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
1071      // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
1072      // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
1073      // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
1074      try {
1075        emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
1076      } catch (error) {
1077        trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
1078        throw error;
1079      }
1080    } else if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY === null) {
1081      // Explicit opt-out for this call: perform no Trusted Types signing and
1082      // create nothing (so a strict `trusted-types` CSP that disallows a
1083      // `dompurify` policy can still call `sanitize` from inside its own
1084      // policy â see #1422). Resetting to `undefined` rather than a sticky
1085      // `null` also drops any previously retained caller policy, so it cannot
1086      // resurface on a later call, while still allowing the next config-less
1087      // call to restore the internal default policy. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
1088      trustedTypesPolicy = undefined;
1089      emptyHTML = '';
1090    } else {
1091      // No policy supplied: keep the currently active policy if one is set â a
1092      // previously supplied policy is intentionally sticky across config-less
1093      // calls â otherwise fall back to the instance's own internal policy,
1094      // created at most once. (A policy supplied for a *single* call still
1095      // lingers by design; what must not linger is a policy whose configuration
1096      // has been torn down via `clearConfig()`, which restores the default.)
1097      if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
1098        trustedTypesPolicy = _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy();
1099      }
1100      // Sign internal variables only when a policy is active. A falsy policy
1101      // (Trusted Types unsupported, creation failed, or an explicit opt-out)
1102      // leaves `emptyHTML` as a plain string, so we never call `.createHTML` on
1103      // a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
1104      if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
1105        emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
1106      }
1107    }
1108    // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
1109    // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
1110    if (freeze) {
1111      freeze(cfg);
1112    }
1113    CONFIG = cfg;
1114  };
1115  /* Keep track of all possible SVG and MathML tags
1116   * so that we can perform the namespace checks
1117   * correctly. */
1118  const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...svgDisallowed]);
1119  const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...mathMl$1, ...mathMlDisallowed]);
1120  /**
1121   * Namespace rules for an element in the SVG namespace.
1122   *
1123   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
1124   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
1125   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
1126   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
1127   */
1128  const _checkSvgNamespace = function _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
1129    // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
1130    // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
1131    // it should be killed.
1132    if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
1133      return tagName === 'svg';
1134    }
1135    // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via <svg>
1136    // if the parent is either <annotation-xml> or a MathML
1137    // text integration point.
1138    if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
1139      return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
1140    }
1141    // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
1142    // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
1143    return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
1144  };
1145  /**
1146   * Namespace rules for an element in the MathML namespace.
1147   *
1148   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
1149   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
1150   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
1151   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
1152   */
1153  const _checkMathMlNamespace = function _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
1154    // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
1155    // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
1156    // it should be killed.
1157    if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
1158      return tagName === 'math';
1159    }
1160    // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
1161    // <math> and HTML integration points
1162    if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
1163      return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
1164    }
1165    // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
1166    // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
1167    return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
1168  };
1169  /**
1170   * Namespace rules for an element in the HTML namespace.
1171   *
1172   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
1173   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
1174   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
1175   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
1176   */
1177  const _checkHtmlNamespace = function _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
1178    // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
1179    // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
1180    // is via MathML text integration points
1181    if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
1182      return false;

vendor: 3,863 bytes, lines 1183-1269

1183    }
1184    if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
1185      return false;
1186    }
1187    // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
1188    // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
1189    return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
1190  };
1191  /**
1192   * @param element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
1193   * @returns Return false if the element has a
1194   *  namespace that a spec-compliant parser would never
1195   *  return. Return true otherwise.
1196   */
1197  const _checkValidNamespace = function _checkValidNamespace(element) {
1198    let parent = getParentNode(element);
1199    // In JSDOM, if we're inside shadow DOM, then parentNode
1200    // can be null. We just simulate parent in this case.
1201    if (!parent || !parent.tagName) {
1202      parent = {
1203        namespaceURI: NAMESPACE,
1204        tagName: 'template'
1205      };
1206    }
1207    const tagName = stringToLowerCase(element.tagName);
1208    const parentTagName = stringToLowerCase(parent.tagName);
1209    if (!ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
1210      return false;
1211    }
1212    if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
1213      return _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
1214    }
1215    if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
1216      return _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
1217    }
1218    if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
1219      return _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
1220    }
1221    // For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
1222    if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
1223      return true;
1224    }
1225    // The code should never reach this place (this means
1226    // that the element somehow got namespace that is not
1227    // HTML, SVG, MathML or allowed via ALLOWED_NAMESPACES).
1228    // Return false just in case.
1229    return false;
1230  };
1231  /**
1232   * _forceRemove
1233   *
1234   * @param node a DOM node
1235   */
1236  const _forceRemove = function _forceRemove(node) {
1237    arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
1238      element: node
1239    });
1240    try {
1241      // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
1242      getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
1243    } catch (_) {
1244      /* The normal detach failed â this is reached for a parentless node
1245         (getParentNode() is null, so .removeChild throws). Element.prototype
1246         .remove() is itself a spec no-op on a parentless node, so a recorded
1247         "removal" would otherwise hand the caller back an intact,
1248         payload-bearing node (e.g. a detached IN_PLACE root the mXSS canary or
1249         the style-with-element-child rule decided to kill). Fail closed by
1250         throwing â exactly as a clobbered root does at the IN_PLACE entry â
1251         rather than trying to "neutralize" the node via its own methods.
1252         Neutralizing would mean calling getAttributeNames()/removeAttribute()
1253         on the node, both of which a <form> root can clobber via a named child
1254         (and _isClobbered does not even probe getAttributeNames), so the
1255         neutralize step could itself be silently defeated, leaving the payload
1256         intact. A throw touches only the cached, clobber-safe remove() and
1257         getParentNode(). Generalizes GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676 (clobbered-form root)
1258         to every root-kill reason. REPORT-3.
1259                This lives inside the catch, so it never fires for a normally-removed
1260         in-tree node: those have a parent, removeChild() succeeds, and the
1261         catch is not entered. Only a kept (parentless) root reaches here. */
1262      remove(node);
1263      if (!getParentNode(node)) {
1264        throw typeErrorCreate('a node selected for removal could not be detached from its tree ' + 'and cannot be safely returned; refusing to sanitize in place');
1265      }
1266    }
1267  };
1268  /**
1269   * _

1269stripAttributeNode
1270   *
1271   * Remove a single Attr node case/namespace-exactly on an attribute-teardown
1272   * path. Name-based removeAttribute() ASCII-lowercases its lookup key for an
1273   * HTML element in an HTML document and so silently misses a case-preserved
1274   * handler (e.g. `ONERROR` off an XML/XHTML import) - the same defect
1275   * _removeAttribute() was fixed for, which a name-based call would reintroduce
1276   * on these IN_PLACE teardown paths. Unlike _removeAttribute this does not
1277   * record into DOMPurify.removed: the neutralize passes intentionally do not
1278   * book-keep. A clobbered/detached node falls back to best-effort name-based
1279   * removal.
1280   *
1281   * @param element the element to strip the attribute from
1282   * @param attribute the Attr node to remove
1283   * @param name the attribute's name, for the fallback path
1284   */
1285  const _stripAttributeNode = function _stripAttributeNode(element, attribute, name) {
1286    try {
1287      removeAttributeNode(element, attribute);
1288    } catch (_) {
1289      try {
1290        element.removeAttribute(name);
1291      } catch (_) {}
1292    }
1293  };
1294  /**
1295   * _neutralizeRoot
1296   *
1297   * Fail-closed teardown of an in-place root after the sanitize walk aborts
1298   * (campaign-3 F2). An internal throw mid-walk â e.g. a page-registered
1299   * custom element's reaction detaches a node so `_forceRemove`'s deliberate
1300   * parentless guard throws, or any other re-entrant engine mutation â would
1301   * otherwise leave the caller's *live* tree half-sanitized, with everything
1302   * after the abort point still carrying its handlers. There is no safe way
1303   * to resume the walk (the tree mutated under us), so we strip the root bare:
1304   * remove every child and every attribute, then let the caller's catch see
1305   * the original error. Clobber-safe (cached `remove`/`childNodes`/`attributes`
1306   * getters; the root was already clobber-pre-flighted at the IN_PLACE entry).
1307   *
1308   * @param root the in-place root to empty
1309   */
1310  const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
1311    /* Strip every disallowed attribute (on* handlers included) off the whole
1312       subtree BEFORE detaching anything. Detaching first would hand back
1313       handler-bearing originals (e.g. an already-loading `<img onerror>`)
1314       whose queued resource event still fires in page scope after we throw.
1315       Clobber-safe reads; a doomed clobbered node's own attributes are
1316       irrelevant while its non-clobbered descendants are reached and scrubbed. */
1317    _neutralizeSubtree(root);
1318    const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
1319    if (childNodes) {
1320      const snapshot = [];
1321      arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
1322        arrayPush(snapshot, child);
1323      });
1324      arrayForEach(snapshot, child => {
1325        try {
1326          remove(child);
1327        } catch (_) {
1328          /* Best-effort teardown; a still-attached child is handled below */
1329        }
1330      });
1331    }
1332    const attributes = getAttributes(root);
1333    if (attributes) {
1334      for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
1335        const attribute = attributes[i];
1336        const name = attribute && attribute.name;
1337        if (typeof name === 'string') {
1338          _stripAttributeNode(root, attribute, name);
1339        }
1340      }
1341    }
1342  };
1343  /**
1344   * _removeAttribute
1345   *
1346   * Name-based getAttributeNode()/removeAttribute() ASCII-lowercase their
1347   * lookup key for HTML elements in an HTML document, so they silently miss an
1348   * attribute whose stored qualified name still contains uppercase ASCII
1349   * letters. That happens when the node came from a case-preserving source
1350   * (an XML/XHTML document imported via importNode(), or createAttributeNS()),
1351   * where e.g. `ONERROR` survives the walk: the policy check lowercases to
1352   * `onerror` and rejects it, but `removeAttribute('ONERROR')` looks up
1353   * `onerror` and finds nothing. Remove the exact Attr node instead, which is
1354   * case- and namespace-exact, and fall back to name-based removal only when
1355   * the caller could not supply the node.
1356   *
1357   * @param name an Attribute name
1358   * @param element a DOM node
1359   * @param attr the exact Attr node to remove, when the caller has it
1360   */
1361  const _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, element, attr) {
1362    if (!attr) {

1363      try {
1364        attr = element.getAttributeNode(name);
1365      } catch (_) {
1366        attr = null;
1367      }
1368    }
1369    arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
1370      attribute: attr || null,
1371      from: element
1372    });
1373    try {
1374      if (attr) {
1375        removeAttributeNode(element, attr);
1376      } else {
1377        element.removeAttribute(name);
1378      }
1379    } catch (_) {
1380      /* Clobbered or already-detached node - best-effort fall back to a
1381         name-based removal so the "is" handling below still runs. Note this
1382         fallback ASCII-lowercases its lookup key in an HTML document and so
1383         cannot reach a case-preserved attribute name; the cached
1384         removeAttributeNode() above is what removes those, and a clobbered
1385         form is already removed wholesale by _isClobbered() before reaching
1386         here

vendor: 15,411 bytes, lines 1386-1722

1386. */
1387      try {
1388        element.removeAttribute(name);
1389      } catch (_) {}
1390    }
1391    // We void attribute values for unremovable "is" attributes
1392    if (name === 'is') {
1393      if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
1394        try {
1395          _forceRemove(element);
1396        } catch (_) {}
1397      } else {
1398        try {
1399          element.setAttribute(name, '');
1400        } catch (_) {}
1401      }
1402    }
1403  };
1404  /**
1405   * _stripDisallowedAttributes
1406   *
1407   * Removes every attribute the active configuration does not allow from a
1408   * single element, using the same allowlist as the main attribute pass (so
1409   * `on*` handlers go, but no `/^on/` blocklist is introduced). Used only to
1410   * neutralise nodes that are being discarded from an in-place tree.
1411   *
1412   * @param element the element to strip
1413   */
1414  const _stripDisallowedAttributes = function _stripDisallowedAttributes(element) {
1415    const attributes = getAttributes(element);
1416    if (!attributes) {
1417      return;
1418    }
1419    for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
1420      const attribute = attributes[i];
1421      const name = attribute && attribute.name;
1422      if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
1423        continue;
1424      }
1425      _stripAttributeNode(element, attribute, name);
1426    }
1427  };
1428  /**
1429   * _neutralizeSubtree
1430   *
1431   * Completes the audit-5 F1 fix across every removal path. The KEEP_CONTENT
1432   * move-hoist neutralises only disallowed-tag removals; clobber, mXSS-canary,
1433   * namespace, comment, processing-instruction and KEEP_CONTENT:false removals
1434   * all drop their subtree wholesale via `_forceRemove`. On the IN_PLACE path
1435   * those dropped nodes are detached from the caller's LIVE tree but a
1436   * handler-bearing original among them (an `<img onerror>`/`<video>` that was
1437   * loading) keeps its queued resource event, which fires in page scope after
1438   * sanitize returns. This walks a removed subtree and strips every attribute
1439   * the active configuration does not allow â so `on*` handlers are cancelled
1440   * through the SAME allowlist that governs kept nodes, not a separate `/^on/`
1441   * blocklist. Run synchronously before sanitize returns, i.e. before any
1442   * queued event can fire. Hook-free by design: these nodes leave the output,
1443   * so firing attribute hooks for them would be surprising. Clobber-safe reads;
1444   * a doomed clobbered node may shadow `removeAttribute` (its own attributes are
1445   * irrelevant â it is discarded â while its non-clobbered descendants, e.g.
1446   * the `<img>`, are reached and scrubbed).
1447   *
1448   * @param root the root of a removed subtree to neutralise
1449   */
1450  const _neutralizeSubtree = function _neutralizeSubtree(root) {
1451    const stack = [root];
1452    while (stack.length > 0) {
1453      const node = stack.pop();
1454      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
1455      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
1456        _stripDisallowedAttributes(node);
1457      }
1458      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
1459      if (childNodes) {
1460        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
1461          stack.push(childNodes[i]);
1462        }
1463      }
1464    }
1465  };
1466  /**
1467   * _neutralizePatchLinkage
1468   *
1469   * IN_PLACE entry pre-pass (declarative-partial-updates / streaming
1470   * hardening, https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
1471   *
1472   * The main walk strips patch linkage (`for`/`patchsrc`) and removes range
1473   * markers (PIs / markup comments) node-by-node, in document order, AS it
1474   * reaches each node. On a live in-place root that leaves a window: from the
1475   * moment the root is connected until the walk arrives at a given node, that
1476   * node's linkage is live. A patch applied on connection/stream can fire as
1477   * a microtask during the walk and inject or teleport an unsanitized DOM
1478   * range into a region the iterator has already passed and will not revisit,
1479   * so the post-return "tree is sanitized" contract is violated. Sweep the
1480   * whole tree once up front and sever every linkage before the walk begins,
1481   * closing that window.
1482   *
1483   * This CANNOT undo a patch that already fired before sanitize ran â that is
1484   * the irreducible "do not IN_PLACE a live-connected attacker tree" caveat â
1485   * but it closes everything from sanitize-start onward. Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML
1486   * to group with the rest of the declarative-partial-updates handling and
1487   * stay overridable, consistent with the codebase.
1488   *
1489   * Clobber-safe traversal (cached childNodes getter); per-node try/catch so a
1490   * clobbered root cannot defeat the sweep of its non-clobbered descendants.
1491   *
1492   * NOTE (pending real-Chrome confirmation, see test/declarative-patch-probe
1493   * .html Q1): this mirrors the existing policy of keeping `for` on
1494   * <label>/<output>. If the shipping feature can drive a patch through a
1495   * surviving `for`-on-label/output + `id` pair, this pre-pass and the
1496   * attribute check at _isBasicCustomElement's caller must additionally drop
1497   * that pair on the IN_PLACE path. Left as-is until the taxonomy is verified.
1498   *
1499   * @param root the in-place root to sweep
1500   */
1501  /**
1502   * Central policy for declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes,
1503   * shared by the _neutralizePatchLinkage pre-pass and _isValidAttribute so
1504   * the two sites cannot drift: `patchsrc` always links, `for` links
1505   * everywhere except on <label>/<output>, and the whole policy is gated on
1506   * SAFE_FOR_XML (see the rationale block in _isValidAttribute).
1507   *
1508   * @param lcName the transformCaseFunc'd attribute name
1509   * @param lcTag the transformCaseFunc'd tag name of the carrying element
1510   * @return true if the attribute is patch linkage and must be dropped
1511   */
1512  const _isPatchLinkageAttribute = function _isPatchLinkageAttribute(lcName, lcTag) {
1513    if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
1514      return false;
1515    }
1516    if (lcName === 'patchsrc') {
1517      return true;
1518    }
1519    return lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output';
1520  };
1521  const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
1522    if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
1523      return;
1524    }
1525    const stack = [root];
1526    while (stack.length > 0) {
1527      const node = stack.pop();
1528      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
1529      /* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
1530         processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
1531      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
1532        try {
1533          remove(node);
1534        } catch (_) {
1535          /* Best-effort */
1536        }
1537        continue;
1538      }
1539      /* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
1540      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
1541        const element = node;
1542        const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(_readNodeName(node));
1543        try {
1544          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
1545            element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
1546          }
1547          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && _isPatchLinkageAttribute('for', lcTag)) {
1548            element.removeAttribute('for');
1549          }
1550        } catch (_) {
1551          /* Clobbered removeAttribute/hasAttribute on a doomed node â ignore */
1552        }
1553      }
1554      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
1555      if (childNodes) {
1556        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
1557          stack.push(childNodes[i]);
1558        }
1559      }
1560    }
1561  };
1562  /**
1563   * _initDocument
1564   *
1565   * @param dirty - a string of dirty markup
1566   * @return a DOM, filled with the dirty markup
1567   */
1568  const _initDocument = function _initDocument(dirty) {
1569    /* Create a HTML document */
1570    let doc = null;
1571    let leadingWhitespace = null;
1572    if (FORCE_BODY) {
1573      dirty = '<remove></remove>' + dirty;
1574    } else {
1575      /* If FORCE_BODY isn't used, leading whitespace needs to be preserved manually */
1576      const matches = stringMatch(dirty, /^[\r\n\t ]+/);
1577      leadingWhitespace = matches && matches[0];
1578    }
1579    if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
1580      // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
1581      dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
1582    }
1583    const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
1584    /*
1585     * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
1586     * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
1587     */
1588    if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
1589      try {
1590        doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(dirtyPayload, PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);
1591      } catch (_) {}
1592    }
1593    /* Use createHTMLDocument in case DOMParser is not available */
1594    if (!doc || !doc.documentElement) {
1595      doc = implementation.createDocument(NAMESPACE, 'template', null);
1596      try {
1597        doc.documentElement.innerHTML = IS_EMPTY_INPUT ? emptyHTML : dirtyPayload;
1598      } catch (_) {
1599        // Syntax error if dirtyPayload is invalid xml
1600      }
1601    }
1602    const body = doc.body || doc.documentElement;
1603    if (dirty && leadingWhitespace) {
1604      body.insertBefore(document.createTextNode(leadingWhitespace), body.childNodes[0] || null);
1605    }
1606    /* Work on whole document or just its body */
1607    if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
1608      return getElementsByTagName.call(doc, WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? 'html' : 'body')[0];
1609    }
1610    return WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? doc.documentElement : body;
1611  };
1612  /**
1613   * Creates a NodeIterator object that you can use to traverse filtered lists of nodes or elements in a document.
1614   *
1615   * @param root The root element or node to start traversing on.
1616   * @return The created NodeIterator
1617   */
1618  const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
1619    /* Read ownerDocument through the cached Node.prototype getter, never the
1620       direct property. HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so a
1621       clobbering child (<input name="ownerDocument"> or a form-associated
1622       external input) shadows the prototype getter and makes a direct read
1623       return that <input>. createNodeIterator.call(<input>, ...) then throws
1624       "Illegal invocation", and on the IN_PLACE path that throw lands before
1625       the walk's fail-closed barrier - leaving the caller's live tree, with
1626       any already-armed handler in it, un-neutralized. The cached getter
1627       returns the real Document regardless of the clobber. */
1628    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(root) : root.ownerDocument;
1629    return createNodeIterator.call(doc || root, root,
1630    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
1631    NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
1632  };
1633  /**
1634   * Replace template expression syntax (mustache, ERB, template
1635   * literal) with a space; shared by all SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES scrub
1636   * sites. Order matters: mustache, then ERB, then template literal.
1637   *
1638   * @param value the string to scrub
1639   * @returns the scrubbed string
1640   */
1641  const _stripTemplateExpressions = function _stripTemplateExpressions(value) {
1642    value = stringReplace(value, MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ' ');
1643    value = stringReplace(value, ERB_EXPR$1, ' ');
1644    value = stringReplace(value, TMPLIT_EXPR$1, ' ');
1645    return value;
1646  };
1647  /**
1648   * Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
1649   * character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
1650   * SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
1651   * which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
1652   * stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
1653   *
1654   * Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
1655   * in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
1656   * descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
1657   * serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data â which means
1658   * `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
1659   * instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
1660   *
1661   * Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
1662   * attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
1663   *
1664   * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
1665   */
1666  const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
1667    var _node$querySelectorAl;
1668    node.normalize();
1669    /* Clobber-safe ownerDocument read, same reasoning as _createNodeIterator:
1670       under SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES this runs on the live IN_PLACE root, which may
1671       carry a form-named-getter override of ownerDocument. */
1672    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(node) : node.ownerDocument;
1673    const walker = createNodeIterator.call(doc || node, node,
1674    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
1675    NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
1676    let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
1677    while (currentNode) {
1678      currentNode.data = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.data);
1679      currentNode = walker.nextNode();
1680    }
1681    // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
1682    // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
1683    // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
1684    const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl.call(node, 'template');
1685    if (templates) {
1686      arrayForEach(templates, tmpl => {
1687        if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
1688          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
1689        }
1690      });
1691    }
1692  };
1693  /**
1694   * _isClobbered
1695   *
1696   * Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
1697   * interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
1698   * `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
1699   * on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
1700   * during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
1701   *
1702   * @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
1703   * @return true if clobbered, false if safe
1704   */
1705  const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
1706    // Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
1707    // name at all, we can't reason about clobbering â return false
1708    // (the caller's other defences still apply).
1709    const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
1710    if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
1711      return false;
1712    }
1713    if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
1714      return false;
1715    }
1716    return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
1717    // Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
1718    // prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
1719    // makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
1720    // (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
1721    // canonical NamedNodeMap.
1722    element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' ||

1722
1723    // A form descendant named "removeAttributeNode" or "getAttributeNode"
1724    // shadows these Attr-node methods via [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns].
1725    // _removeAttribute() / _stripAttributeNode() reach for
1726    // element.removeAttributeNode(attr) first; when it is shadowed the call
1727    // throws and the name-based fallback element.removeAttribute(name)
1728    // ASCII-lowercases its lookup key in an HTML document, silently missing
1729    // a case-preserved event-handler attribute (e.g. an ONANIMATIONSTART
1730    // that reached the sanitizer through an XML/XHTML parse). Flag the form
1731    // so it is removed wholesale, exactly as for the other shadowed methods.
1732    typeof element.removeAttributeNode !== 'function' || typeof element.getAttributeNod

vendor: 25,440 bytes, lines 1732-2223

1732e !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
1733    // NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
1734    // returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
1735    // read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
1736    // the named child element. Cheap addition â nodeType is read from
1737    // an internal slot, no serialization cost â and removes a residual
1738    // clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
1739    // in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
1740    element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
1741    // HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
1742    // "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
1743    // form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
1744    // instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
1745    // skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
1746    // cached Node.prototype getter â when the form's named-property
1747    // getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
1748    // the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
1749    // select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
1750    // carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
1751    // (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
1752    element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
1753  };
1754  /**
1755   * Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
1756   *
1757   * The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
1758   * Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
1759   * constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
1760   * internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
1761   *
1762   * @param value object to check
1763   * @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
1764   */
1765  const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
1766    if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
1767      return false;
1768    }
1769    try {
1770      return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
1771    } catch (_) {
1772      return false;
1773    }
1774  };
1775  /**
1776   * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
1777   * originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
1778   * contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
1779   * realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
1780   * sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
1781   * returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
1782   *
1783   * @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
1784   * @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
1785   */
1786  const _isNode = function _isNode(value) {
1787    if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
1788      return false;
1789    }
1790    try {
1791      return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
1792    } catch (_) {
1793      return false;
1794    }
1795  };
1796  function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
1797    if (hooks.length === 0) {
1798      return;
1799    }
1800    arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
1801      hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
1802    });
1803  }
1804  /**
1805   * Structural-threat checks that condemn a node regardless of the
1806   * allowlists: mXSS via namespace confusion, risky CSS construction,
1807   * processing instructions, markup-bearing comments. Pure predicate;
1808   * the caller removes. Check order is load-bearing.
1809   *
1810   * @param currentNode the node to inspect
1811   * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
1812   * @return true if the node must be removed
1813   */
1814  const _isUnsafeNode = function _isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName) {
1815    /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
1816    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.textContent) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
1817      return true;
1818    }
1819    /* Remove rawtext/literal-text elements whose literal serialization
1820       re-opens markup on an HTML reparse - shapes (a) and (b) documented at
1821       LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS. Both are invisible to rule 1 above (which
1822       self-disables once there is an element child, and whose second probe
1823       reads the innerHTML an XML/XHTML document serializes escaped), which
1824       is why both probes here read textContent instead. Previously only
1825       `style`-with-element-child was covered; every element in
1826       LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS shares this literal serialization and is
1827       equally affected. */
1828    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS[tagName] && (_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) || typeof currentNode.textContent === 'string' && regExpTest(LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE[tagName], currentNode.textContent))) {
1829      return true;
1830    }
1831    /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
1832    if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction) {
1833      return true;
1834    }
1835    /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
1836    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.data)) {
1837      return true;
1838    }
1839    return false;
1840  };
1841  /**
1842   * Evaluate a CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING check (a RegExp or a predicate
1843   * function, per the validation in _parseConfig) against a name.
1844   * Additional arguments are forwarded to predicate functions - the
1845   * attributeNameCheck predicate receives the tag name as its second
1846   * argument. A null/absent check never matches.
1847   *
1848   * @param check the configured tagNameCheck / attributeNameCheck value
1849   * @param name the name to test
1850   * @param args extra arguments forwarded to a predicate function
1851   * @return true if the check matches the name
1852   */
1853  const _matchesNameCheck = function _matchesNameCheck(check, name) {
1854    if (check instanceof RegExp) {
1855      return regExpTest(check, name);
1856    }
1857    if (check instanceof Function) {
1858      for (var _len = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len > 2 ? _len - 2 : 0), _key = 2; _key < _len; _key++) {
1859        args[_key - 2] = arguments[_key];
1860      }
1861      return Boolean(check(name, ...args));
1862    }
1863    return false;
1864  };
1865  /**
1866   * Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
1867   * allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
1868   * early - the namespace and fallback-tag removal checks are
1869   * intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else hoist
1870   * content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
1871   *
1872   * A kept custom element is the ONLY case in which this function
1873   * returns false, so the caller uses that return value to run the
1874   * afterSanitizeElements hook on the kept element and keep the
1875   * element-hook lifecycle consistent with normal allowlisted
1876   * elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4).
1877   *
1878   * @param currentNode the disallowed node
1879   * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
1880   * @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
1881   */
1882  const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
1883    /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
1884    if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
1885      return false;
1886    }
1887    /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
1888         Use the cached prototype getters exclusively â the previous code
1889         had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
1890         fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
1891         value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
1892         path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
1893         ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
1894         parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
1895    if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
1896      const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
1897      const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
1898      if (childNodes && parentNode) {
1899        const childCount = childNodes.length;
1900        /* Hoist by moving each child up one level rather than deep-cloning
1901             it. Moving transfers every descendant exactly once, so a chain of
1902             nested disallowed elements costs O(n) instead of the O(n^2) that
1903             re-cloning the shrinking subtree at each level produced; it also
1904             empties the removed original, so `DOMPurify.removed` no longer
1905             pins whole subtrees. Moving preserves the in-place guarantee too:
1906             an original carrying already-queued resource events (`<img
1907             onerror>`, `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, â¦) is
1908             relocated and sanitised rather than left detached but still armed.
1909                      The sole case that must clone is removing the walk root itself.
1910             The result is serialised from the root's subtree, so a restrictive
1911             ALLOWED_TAGS that strips the root (`body` on the string path) must
1912             leave the content inside it, which only cloning does. In IN_PLACE
1913             the root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never removed
1914             here, so that path always takes the move branch.
1915                      `childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
1916             valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
1917             the list intact). */
1918        for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
1919          const hoisted = currentNode === root ? cloneNode(childNodes[i], true) : childNodes[i];
1920          parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
1921        }
1922      }
1923    }
1924    _forceRemove(currentNode);
1925    return true;
1926  };
1927  /**
1928   * Fork a hook-mutable allowlist off its shared binding the first time a
1929   * (possibly lazily-installed) uponSanitize* hook is about to see it, so the
1930   * hook cannot widen the per-instance default or the setConfig binding by
1931   * reference and leak past the call. Returns the set unchanged once it is
1932   * already call-local, so repeated calls across elements are idempotent.
1933   *
1934   * @param hookList the uponSanitize* hook array for this event
1935   * @param set the current ALLOWED_TAGS / ALLOWED_ATTR binding
1936   * @param defaultSet the per-instance DEFAULT_ALLOWED_* constant
1937   * @param setConfigSet the captured setConfig() binding, or null
1938   * @return a call-local clone if a hook is present and set is still shared,
1939   *   else set unchanged
1940   */
1941  const _forkSharedAllowlist = function _forkSharedAllowlist(hookList, set, defaultSet, setConfigSet) {
1942    if (hookList.length === 0) {
1943      return set;
1944    }
1945    return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
1946  };
1947  /**
1948   * Shared guard for a node that a hook has detached from the walk tree,
1949   * used after each element-hook site in _sanitizeElements. Detaching is a
1950   * long-standing user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject
1951   * filtering). Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
1952   * genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
1953   * output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
1954   * processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace checks
1955   * would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit the REPORT-3
1956   * fail-closed throw â which exists for nodes DOMPurify wants gone but
1957   * *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the opposite of a node
1958   * that is already safely gone. The walk root is exempt: a detached
1959   * IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still be fully sanitized,
1960   * and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the REPORT-3 throw.
1961   *
1962   * Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's responsibility for placement:
1963   * they are not recorded in DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE
1964   * pass (which iterates DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a
1965   * hook-detached subtree can still hold a queued resource-event handler -
1966   * e.g. an <img onload> that began loading when the caller built the live
1967   * tree - which fires in page scope after sanitize returns even though the
1968   * handler never reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard,
1969   * and the documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it.
1970   * So on the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline,
1971   * stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly as
1972   * the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees.
1973   *
1974   * @param currentNode the node a hook may have detached
1975   * @param root the current walk root
1976   * @return true if the node is detached and now handled, false otherwise
1977   */
1978  const _handleHookDetachedNode = function _handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root) {
1979    if (currentNode === root || getParentNode(currentNode) !== null) {
1980      return false;
1981    }
1982    if (IN_PLACE) {
1983      _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
1984    }
1985    return true;
1986  };
1987  /**
1988   * _sanitizeElements
1989   *
1990   * @protect nodeName
1991   * @protect textContent
1992   * @protect removeChild
1993   * @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
1994   * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
1995   */
1996  const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
1997    /* Execute a hook if present */
1998    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
1999    /* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see
2000       _handleHookDetachedNode for the full rationale). */
2001    if (_handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root)) {
2002      return true;
2003    }
2004    /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
2005    if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
2006      _forceRemove(currentNode);
2007      return true;
2008    }
2009    /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
2010    const tagName = transformCaseFunc(_readNodeName(currentNode));
2011    /* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
2012       hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
2013       (e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
2014       aliasing a shared binding that a widening hook would mutate by
2015       reference. Fork it before exposing it to the hook. */
2016    ALLOWED_TAGS = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, ALLOWED_TAGS, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS);
2017    /* Execute a hook if present */
2018    _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
2019      tagName,
2020      allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
2021    });
2022    /* The uponSanitizeElement hook may have detached the node, exactly as
2023       above (see _handleHookDetachedNode for the full rationale). */
2024    if (_handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root)) {
2025      return true;
2026    }
2027    /* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
2028    if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
2029      _forceRemove(currentNode);
2030      return true;
2031    }
2032    /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
2033    if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
2034      const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root);
2035      /* A false return means the node is a custom element kept via
2036         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING - the only keep path through
2037         _sanitizeDisallowedNode. Run afterSanitizeElements on it so the
2038         element-hook lifecycle matches normal allowlisted elements: a
2039         security policy applied in this hook (e.g. stripping an attribute
2040         from every surviving element) must not silently skip kept custom
2041         elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4). This mirrors the normal-element
2042         tail below - the hook runs, then the walker's subsequent
2043         _sanitizeAttributes pass sanitizes the element's attributes. The
2044         deliberately skipped namespace and fallback-tag removal checks stay
2045         skipped; they are removal decisions, not the hook contract. */
2046      if (removed === false) {
2047        _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
2048      }
2049      return removed;
2050    }
2051    /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
2052       Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
2053       nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
2054       bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
2055       realm â letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
2056       slip past the namespace check entirely. */
2057    const nt = _readNodeType(currentNode);
2058    if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
2059      _forceRemove(currentNode);
2060      return true;
2061    }
2062    /* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
2063    if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
2064      _forceRemove(currentNode);
2065      return true;
2066    }
2067    /* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
2068    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
2069      /* Get the element's text content */
2070      const content = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.textContent);
2071      if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
2072        arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
2073          element: currentNode.cloneNode()
2074        });
2075        currentNode.textContent = content;
2076      }
2077    }
2078    /* Execute a hook if present */
2079    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
2080    return false;
2081  };
2082  /**
2083   * _isValidAttribute
2084   *
2085   * @param lcTag Lowercase tag name of containing element.
2086   * @param lcName Lowercase attribute name.
2087   * @param value Attribute value.
2088   * @return Returns true if `value` is valid, otherwise false.
2089   */
2090  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
2091  const _isValidAttribute = function _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value) {
2092    /* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */
2093    if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
2094      return false;
2095    }
2096    /* Reject declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes
2097       (https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
2098            Empirical note (Chrome 150, verified â see
2099       test/declarative-patch-probe-v3.html): expansion is NOT applied after
2100       sanitization. For the string path it fires during sanitize()'s own
2101       parse, so the walk sees and sanitizes the fully materialized expanded
2102       tree â teleports into MathML/SVG integration points included; a
2103       weaponized `<template for>`->`<img onerror>` comes back with the handler
2104       stripped. For the IN_PLACE path it fires on connection, before the walk.
2105       Either way DOMPurify is NOT blind to the patch.
2106            This removal is therefore defense-in-depth rather than the sole barrier:
2107       it prevents live linkage from surviving into the OUTPUT and re-expanding
2108       in the caller's context, and keeps behaviour deterministic if a future
2109       engine defers expansion. `for` is legitimate only on <label>/<output>;
2110       anywhere else (notably <template for>) it links the element to a patch
2111       target and teleports or removes an arbitrary DOM range by id/marker name.
2112       `patchsrc` fetches remote markup and is treated as a script-loading
2113       mechanism (CSP). Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML so the removal groups with the
2114       other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
2115       the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
2116       _isUnsafeNode. */
2117    if (_isPatchLinkageAttribute(lcName, lcTag)) {
2118      return false;
2119    }
2120    /* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
2121    if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
2122      return false;
2123    }
2124    const nameIsPermitted = ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag);
2125    /* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
2126        (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
2127        XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
2128        We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
2129    if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) {
2130      return true;
2131    }
2132    /* Allow valid aria-* attributes, the value is always URI safe */
2133    if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) {
2134      return true;
2135    }
2136    /* A name outside the allowlist is acceptable on custom-element terms
2137       only. The value checks below are intentionally skipped in that case:
2138       if the user supplied a tagNameCheck we also allow derived custom
2139       elements using the same test, and attributes passing the configured
2140       attributeNameCheck are allowed as custom elements define these at
2141       their own discretion. */
2142    if (!nameIsPermitted) {
2143      return (
2144        // Condition a) covers a basically valid custom element tag name whose
2145        // tag passes the configured tagNameCheck and whose attribute name
2146        // passes the configured attributeNameCheck ...
2147        _isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName, lcTag) ||
2148        // Condition b) covers an `is` attribute whose value passes the
2149        // configured tagNameCheck while customized built-in elements are
2150        // allowed.
2151        lcName === 'is' && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value)
2152      );
2153    }
2154    /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
2155    if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) {
2156      return true;
2157    }
2158    /* Check no script, data or unknown possibly unsafe URI
2159        unless we know URI values are safe for that attribute */
2160    if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) {
2161      return true;
2162    }
2163    /* Keep image data URIs alive if src/xlink:href is allowed */
2164    /* Further prevent gadget XSS for dynamically built script tags */
2165    if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) {
2166      return true;
2167    }
2168    /* Allow unknown protocols: This provides support for links that
2169        are handled by protocol handlers which may be unknown ahead of
2170        time, e.g. fb:, spotify: */
2171    if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) {
2172      return true;
2173    }
2174    /* Only an empty (binary) value remains safe at this point;
2175       anything else is presumed unsafe, do not add it back */
2176    return !value;
2177  };
2178  /* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
2179   * never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
2180   * CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck is configured. */
2181  const RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'color-profile', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'missing-glyph']);
2182  /**
2183   * _isBasicCustomElement
2184   * checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
2185   * for more sophisticated checking see https://github.com/sindresorhus/validate-element-name
2186   *
2187   * @param tagName name of the tag of the node to sanitize
2188   * @returns Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
2189   */
2190  const _isBasicCustomElement = function _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) {
2191    return !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1, tagName);
2192  };
2193  /**
2194   * Wrap an attribute value in the matching Trusted Types object when
2195   * the active policy requires it. Namespaced attributes pass through
2196   * unchanged (no TT support yet, see
2197   * https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293).
2198   *
2199   * @param lcTag lowercase tag name of the containing element
2200   * @param lcName lowercase attribute name
2201   * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
2202   * @param value the attribute value to wrap
2203   * @return the value, wrapped when Trusted Types demand it
2204   */
2205  const _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute = function _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value) {
2206    if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function' && !namespaceURI) {
2207      switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
2208        case 'TrustedHTML':
2209          {
2210            return _createTrustedHTML(value);
2211          }
2212        case 'TrustedScriptURL':
2213          {
2214            return _createTrustedScriptURL(value);
2215          }
2216      }
2217    }
2218    return value;
2219  };
2220  /**
2221   * Write a modified attribute value back onto the element. On
2222   * success, re-probe for clobbering introduced by the new value and
2223   * remove the element when found; otherwise

2223, when this writeback is the
2224   * recreate half of the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS remove-and-recreate, pop the
2225   * removal entry that path recorded so it does not show as removed. On
2226   * failure, remove the attribute instead.
2227   *
2228   * Returns true only on a clean write (the value was set and the new value
2229   * introduced no clobbering). The caller uses that, together with its own
2230   * knowledge of whether this attribute pushed a DOMPurify.removed record, to
2231   * decide whether to pop that record. The pop must happen ONLY for the
2232   * named-prop remove-and-recreate; popping on any other value change (trim,
2233   * template scrubbing, Trusted Types) would consume an unrelated _forceRemove
2234   * subtree-cleanup record and let that detached subtree keep a live event
2235   * handler through the IN_PLACE neutralization pass (SO-001).
2236   *
2237   * @param currentNode the element carrying the attribute
2238   * @param name the attribute name as present on the element
2239   * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
2240   * @param value the new attribute value
2241   * @return true if the value was written without introducing clobbering
2242   */
2243  const _setAttributeValue = function _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value) {
2244    try {
2245      if (namespaceURI) {
2246        currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
2247      } else {
2248        /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
2249        currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
2250      }
2251      if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
2252        _forceRemove(currentNode);
2253        return false;
2254      }
2255      return true;
2256    } catch (_) {
2257      _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
2258      return false;

vendor: 4,874 bytes, lines 2259-2366

2259    }
2260  };
2261  /**
2262   * _sanitizeAttributes
2263   *
2264   * @protect attributes
2265   * @protect nodeName
2266   * @protect removeAttribute
2267   * @protect setAttribute
2268   *
2269   * @param currentNode to sanitize
2270   */
2271  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
2272  const _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
2273    /* Execute a hook if present */
2274    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
2275    const attributes = currentNode.attributes;
2276    /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
2277    if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
2278      return;
2279    }
2280    /* Same lazy-install guard as uponSanitizeElement (see there): fork the
2281       attribute allowlist off its shared binding before a hook can see it. */
2282    ALLOWED_ATTR = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, ALLOWED_ATTR, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR);
2283    const hookEvent = {
2284      attrName: '',
2285      attrValue: '',
2286      keepAttr: true,
2287      allowedAttributes: ALLOWED_ATTR,
2288      forceKeepAttr: undefined
2289    };
2290    let l = attributes.length;
2291    const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
2292    /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
2293    while (l--) {
2294      const attr = attributes[l];
2295      const name = attr.name,
2296        namespaceURI = attr.namespaceURI,
2297        attrValue = attr.value;
2298      const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
2299      const initValue = attrValue;
2300      let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);
2301      /* Tracks whether this specific attribute pushed a DOMPurify.removed
2302         record that a later _setAttributeValue() writeback is expected to pop
2303         back off (the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS remove-and-recreate below is the
2304         only path that does). A value that merely changed via trim, template
2305         scrubbing, or Trusted Types pushes no such record, so its writeback
2306         must NOT pop â otherwise it consumes an unrelated _forceRemove subtree
2307         record and that detached subtree escapes the IN_PLACE handler-
2308         neutralization pass (SO-001). */
2309      let recreatedNamedProp = false;
2310      /* Execute a hook if present */
2311      hookEvent.attrName = lcName;
2312      hookEvent.attrValue = value;
2313      hookEvent.keepAttr = true;
2314      hookEvent.forceKeepAttr = undefined; // Allows developers to see this is a property they can set
2315      _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, currentNode, hookEvent);
2316      value = hookEvent.attrValue;
2317      /* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
2318       * Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
2319       */
2320      if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
2321        // Remove the attribute with this value
2322        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
2323        // Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
2324        value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
2325        // This attribute owns the record just pushed; its recreate writeback
2326        // is the one allowed to pop it back off.
2327        recreatedNamedProp = true;
2328      }
2329      // Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone â the prefix is
2330      // itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
2331      /* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
2332      if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
2333        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
2334        continue;
2335      }
2336      /* Make sure we cannot easily use animated hrefs, even if animations are allowed */
2337      if (lcName === 'attributename' && stringMatch(value, 'href')) {
2338        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
2339        continue;
2340      }
2341      /* Did the hooks force-keep the attribute? */
2342      if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
2343        continue;
2344      }
2345      /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
2346      if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
2347        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
2348        continue;
2349      }
2350      /* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
2351      if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(SELF_CLOSING_TAG, value)) {
2352        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
2353        continue;
2354      }
2355      /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
2356      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
2357        value = _stripTemplateExpressions(value);
2358      }
2359      /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
2360      if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
2361        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
2362        continue;
2363      }
2364      /* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
2365      value = _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value);
2366      /* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */

2367      if (value !== initValue) {
2368        const cleanWrite = _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value);
2369        /* Only the named-prop remove-and-recreate owns a DOMPurify.removed
2370           record to pop; a plain trim/template/Trusted-Types writeback owns
2371           none, so popping here would drop an unrelated subtree's cleanup
2372           record (SO-001). */
2373        if (cleanWrite && recreatedNamedProp) {
2374          arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
2375        }

vendor: 13,096 bytes, lines 2375-2651

2375
2376      }
2377    }
2378    /* Execute a hook if present */
2379    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
2380  };
2381  /**
2382   * _sanitizeShadowDOM
2383   *
2384   * @param fragment to iterate over recursively
2385   */
2386  const _sanitizeShadowDOM2 = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
2387    let shadowNode = null;
2388    const shadowIterator = _createNodeIterator(fragment);
2389    /* Execute a hook if present */
2390    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
2391    while (shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode()) {
2392      /* Execute a hook if present */
2393      _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);
2394      /* Sanitize tags and elements */
2395      _sanitizeElements(shadowNode, fragment);
2396      /* Check attributes next */
2397      _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
2398      /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
2399         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
2400         DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
2401         recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
2402      if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
2403        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
2404      }
2405      /* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
2406         shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
2407         trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
2408         previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
2409         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
2410         doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
2411         above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
2412         Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
2413         shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
2414         iterator also surfaces. */
2415      if (_readNodeType(shadowNode) === NODE_TYPE.element) {
2416        const innerSr = getShadowRoot(shadowNode);
2417        if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
2418          _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
2419          _sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
2420        }
2421      }
2422    }
2423    /* Execute a hook if present */
2424    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
2425  };
2426  /**
2427   * _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots
2428   *
2429   * Walks `root` and feeds every attached shadow root we encounter into
2430   * the existing _sanitizeShadowDOM pipeline. The default node iterator
2431   * does not descend into shadow trees, so nodes inside an attached
2432   * shadow root would otherwise be skipped entirely.
2433   *
2434   * Two real input paths put attached shadow roots in front of us:
2435   *   1. IN_PLACE on a DOM node that already has shadow roots attached.
2436   *   2. DOM-node input where importNode(dirty, true) deep-clones the
2437   *      shadow root because it was created with `clonable: true`.
2438   *
2439   * This pass runs once, up front, so the main iteration loop (and the
2440   * existing _sanitizeShadowDOM template-content recursion) stay
2441   * untouched â string-input paths are not affected.
2442   *
2443   * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
2444   */
2445  const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
2446    /* Iterative (explicit stack) rather than per-child recursion. DOM APIs
2447       impose no depth cap, so an attacker-shaped tree (JSON/CRDT/editor data
2448       built straight into the DOM â the IN_PLACE surface) deeper than the JS
2449       call-stack budget would otherwise overflow native recursion here and
2450       throw at the IN_PLACE entry pre-pass, before a single node is
2451       sanitized, leaving the caller's live tree untouched (fail-open). See
2452       campaign-3 F4. A heap stack keeps depth off the call stack.
2453            Each work item is either a node to descend into, or a deferred
2454       `_sanitizeShadowDOM` for an already-walked shadow root. The deferred
2455       form preserves the original post-order discipline: a shadow root's
2456       nested shadow roots are discovered before the outer shadow is
2457       sanitized (which may remove hosts). Pushes are in reverse of the
2458       desired processing order (LIFO): template content, then children, then
2459       the shadow-sanitize, then the shadow walk â so the order matches the
2460       previous recursion exactly. */
2461    const stack = [{
2462      node: root,
2463      shadow: null
2464    }];
2465    while (stack.length > 0) {
2466      const item = stack.pop();
2467      /* Deferred shadow-DOM sanitisation: runs after its subtree was walked. */
2468      if (item.shadow) {
2469        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(item.shadow);
2470        continue;
2471      }
2472      const node = item.node;
2473      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
2474      const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;
2475      /* (pushed last â processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
2476         the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
2477         hook may detach siblings mid-walk. */
2478      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
2479      if (childNodes) {
2480        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
2481          stack.push({
2482            node: childNodes[i],
2483            shadow: null
2484          });
2485        }
2486      }
2487      /* (pushed before children â processed after them, matching the old
2488         "template content last" order) When the node is a <template>,
2489         descend into its content. */
2490      if (isElement) {
2491        const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : null;
2492        if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
2493          const content = node.content;
2494          if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
2495            stack.push({
2496              node: content,
2497              shadow: null
2498            });
2499          }
2500        }
2501      }
2502      /* Shadow root (processed first): walk its subtree, then sanitise it.
2503         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
2504         rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is realm-bound and
2505         silently skipped foreign-realm shadow roots (e.g.
2506         iframe.contentDocument attachShadow). */
2507      if (isElement) {
2508        const sr = getShadowRoot(node);
2509        if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
2510          /* Push the deferred sanitise first so it pops after the shadow
2511             walk we push next, i.e. nested shadow roots are discovered
2512             before this one is sanitised. */
2513          stack.push({
2514            node: null,
2515            shadow: sr
2516          }, {
2517            node: sr,
2518            shadow: null
2519          });
2520        }
2521      }
2522    }
2523  };
2524  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
2525  DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
2526    let cfg = arguments.length > 1 && arguments[1] !== undefined ? arguments[1] : {};
2527    let body = null;
2528    let importedNode = null;
2529    let currentNode = null;
2530    let returnNode = null;
2531    /* Make sure we have a string to sanitize.
2532      DO NOT return early, as this will return the wrong type if
2533      the user has requested a DOM object rather than a string */
2534    IS_EMPTY_INPUT = !dirty;
2535    if (IS_EMPTY_INPUT) {
2536      dirty = '<!-->';
2537    }
2538    /* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
2539    if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
2540      dirty = stringifyValue(dirty);
2541      if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
2542        throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
2543      }
2544    }
2545    /* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
2546    if (!DOMPurify.isSupported) {
2547      return dirty;
2548    }
2549    /* Assign config vars */
2550    if (SET_CONFIG) {
2551      /* Persistent setConfig() path: _parseConfig is skipped, so the sets are
2552       * not re-derived per call. Restore them from the pristine bindings
2553       * captured at setConfig() time so a previous call's hook clone (mutated
2554       * below) does not carry over. */
2555      ALLOWED_TAGS = SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS;
2556      ALLOWED_ATTR = SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR;
2557    } else {
2558      _parseConfig(cfg);
2559    }
2560    /* Clone the hook-mutable allowlists before the walk whenever an
2561     * uponSanitize* hook is registered. The hook event exposes ALLOWED_TAGS
2562     * and ALLOWED_ATTR by reference (as allowedTags / allowedAttributes), so
2563     * a hook that widens them would otherwise mutate the shared set
2564     * permanently: across later calls and across every element. Cloning per
2565     * walk keeps documented in-call widening working while scoping it to the
2566     * call. A single guard for both config paths - the per-call path rebinds
2567     * the sets in _parseConfig each call, the persistent path restores them
2568     * from the captured bindings just above - so the two cannot diverge. */
2569    if (hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) {
2570      ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
2571    }
2572    if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) {
2573      ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
2574    }
2575    /* Clean up removed elements */
2576    DOMPurify.removed = [];
2577    /* Resolve IN_PLACE for this call without mutating persistent config.
2578       Writing the IN_PLACE closure variable here leaks under setConfig(),
2579       where _parseConfig is skipped on later calls: a single string call would
2580       disable in-place mode for every subsequent node call, returning a
2581       sanitized copy while leaving the caller's node â which in-place callers
2582       keep using and whose return value they ignore â unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
2583    const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
2584    if (inPlace) {
2585      /* Declarative-partial-updates / streaming pre-pass: sever every patch
2586         linkage across the live tree BEFORE the walk, so no patch can fire
2587         mid-walk and inject into an already-processed region. Runs first, so
2588         it also covers the forbidden/clobbered roots that throw below. */
2589      _neutralizePatchLinkage(dirty);
2590      /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
2591         Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter â a clobbering
2592         child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
2593         the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
2594         validation entirely. */
2595      const nn = _readNodeName(dirty);
2596      if (typeof nn === 'string') {
2597        const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
2598        if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
2599          /* Fail closed on a live root: neutralize handlers/children before
2600             throwing, exactly as the mid-walk abort path does. */
2601          _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
2602          throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
2603        }
2604      }
2605      /* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
2606         removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
2607         falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
2608         is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
2609         then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
2610         because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
2611         result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
2612         event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
2613         the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
2614         the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
2615      if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
2616        /* Fail closed on a live clobbered root before throwing.
2617           _neutralizeRoot's reads are clobber-safe (cached getters); the
2618           form's non-clobbered descendants, e.g. an armed <img>, are scrubbed. */
2619        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
2620        throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
2621      }
2622      /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
2623         The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. Same fail-closed
2624         barrier as the main walk (campaign-3 F2): a custom-element reaction
2625         inside a shadow root could abort this pre-pass before the walk runs,
2626         which would otherwise leave the entire live tree unsanitized. */
2627      try {
2628        _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(dirty);
2629      } catch (error) {
2630        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
2631        throw error;
2632      }
2633    } else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
2634      /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
2635         elements being stripped by the parser */
2636      body = _initDocument('<!---->');
2637      importedNode = body.ownerDocument.importNode(dirty, true);
2638      if (importedNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element && importedNode.nodeName === 'BODY') {
2639        /* Node is already a body, use as is */
2640        body = importedNode;
2641      } else if (importedNode.nodeName === 'HTML') {
2642        body = importedNode;
2643      } else {
2644        // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
2645        body.appendChild(importedNode);
2646      }
2647      /* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
2648         them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
2649         descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
2650         cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
2651         cannot hide a shadow host from this pass.

2651
2652                Traverse from `body`, not `importedNode`: when importedNode is a
2653         DocumentFragment, the appendChild() above moves its children into
2654         `body` and leaves the fragment empty, so walking importedNode would
2655         scan nothing and miss every attached shadow host now under `body`
2656         (SO-003). In the BODY/HTML branches `body === importedNode`, so this
2657         is equivalent there; in the element branch `body` contains the
2658         appended element and its descendants. `body` covers all three. */
2659      _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(body);
2660    } else {
2661      /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
2662      if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
2663      // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
2664      dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
2665        return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
2666      }
2667      /* Initialize the document to work on */
2668      body = _initDocument(dirty);
2669      /* Check we have a DOM node from the data */
2670      if (!body) {
2671        return RETURN_DOM ? null : RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? emptyHTML : '';
2672      }
2673    }
2674    /* Remove first element node (ours) if FORCE_BODY is set */
2675    if (body && FORCE_BODY) {
2676      _forceRemove(body.firstChild);
2677    }
2678    /* Get node iterator */
2679    const walkRoot = inPlace ? dirty : body;
2680    /* Now start iterating over the created document.
2681       The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
2682       engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
2683       `_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
2684       barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
2685       unvisited tail still armed. _createNodeIterator itself is inside the
2686       barrier too: constructing the iterator dereferences the root's document,
2687       and any failure there (e.g. an exotic/clobbered root) must still fail
2688       closed rather than skip the neutralize. On any throw we fail closed -
2689       strip the in-place root bare - then rethrow so the existing throw
2690       contract is preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial
2691       body, so the propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
2692    try {
2693      const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);

vendor: 5,911 bytes, lines 2693-2840

2693
2694      while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
2695        /* Sanitize tags and elements */
2696        _sanitizeElements(currentNode, walkRoot);
2697        /* Check attributes next */
2698        _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
2699        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
2700           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
2701           instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
2702           walked correctly. */
2703        if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
2704          _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
2705        }
2706      }
2707    } catch (error) {
2708      if (inPlace) {
2709        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
2710        /* Nodes _forceRemove'd earlier in the aborted walk are already
2711           detached from the root, so _neutralizeRoot's subtree pass does not
2712           reach them. Defuse them too, mirroring the success-path loop below. */
2713        arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
2714          if (entry.element) {
2715            _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
2716          }
2717        });
2718      }
2719      throw error;
2720    }
2721    /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
2722    if (inPlace) {
2723      /* Fail-closed completion of the audit-5 F1 fix: every node removed from
2724         the caller's live tree is detached but may still hold a queued
2725         resource-event handler that fires in page scope after we return. The
2726         move-hoist covers only disallowed-tag KEEP_CONTENT removals; strip the
2727         non-allow-listed attributes off every other removed subtree (clobber,
2728         mXSS, namespace, comments, KEEP_CONTENT:false, â¦) so those handlers are
2729         cancelled before any event can fire. Runs synchronously, pre-return. */
2730      arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
2731        if (entry.element) {
2732          _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
2733        }
2734      });
2735      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
2736        _scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
2737      }
2738      return dirty;
2739    }
2740    /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
2741    if (RETURN_DOM) {
2742      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
2743        _scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
2744      }
2745      if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
2746        returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
2747        while (body.firstChild) {
2748          // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
2749          returnNode.appendChild(body.firstChild);
2750        }
2751      } else {
2752        returnNode = body;
2753      }
2754      if (ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowroot || ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowrootmode) {
2755        /*
2756          AdoptNode() is not used because internal state is not reset
2757          (e.g. the past names map of a HTMLFormElement), this is safe
2758          in theory but we would rather not risk another attack vector.
2759          The state that is cloned by importNode() is explicitly defined
2760          by the specs.
2761        */
2762        returnNode = importNode.call(originalDocument, returnNode, true);
2763      }
2764      return returnNode;
2765    }
2766    let serializedHTML = WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? body.outerHTML : body.innerHTML;
2767    /* Serialize doctype if allowed */
2768    if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT && ALLOWED_TAGS['!doctype'] && body.ownerDocument && body.ownerDocument.doctype && body.ownerDocument.doctype.name && regExpTest(DOCTYPE_NAME, body.ownerDocument.doctype.name)) {
2769      serializedHTML = '<!DOCTYPE ' + body.ownerDocument.doctype.name + '>\n' + serializedHTML;
2770    }
2771    /* Sanitize final string template-safe */
2772    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
2773      serializedHTML = _stripTemplateExpressions(serializedHTML);
2774    }
2775    return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
2776  };
2777  DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
2778    let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
2779    _parseConfig(cfg);
2780    SET_CONFIG = true;
2781    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = ALLOWED_TAGS;
2782    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = ALLOWED_ATTR;
2783  };
2784  DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
2785    CONFIG = null;
2786    SET_CONFIG = false;
2787    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
2788    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
2789    // Drop any caller-supplied Trusted Types policy so it cannot poison later
2790    // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output. The internal default policy (cached, and
2791    // never recreated â Trusted Types throws on duplicate names) is restored by
2792    // the next `_parseConfig`. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
2793    trustedTypesPolicy = defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
2794    emptyHTML = '';
2795  };
2796  DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
2797    /* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
2798    if (!CONFIG) {
2799      _parseConfig({});
2800    }
2801    const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(tag);
2802    const lcName = transformCaseFunc(attr);
2803    return _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value);
2804  };
2805  DOMPurify.addHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
2806    if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {
2807      return;
2808    }
2809    /* Reject unknown entry points. Without this, a non-hook key (e.g.
2810     * '__proto__') indexes off the prototype chain rather than a real
2811     * hook array, and arrayPush then writes to Object.prototype. Guard
2812     * with an own-property check against the known hook names. */
2813    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
2814      return;
2815    }
2816    arrayPush(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
2817  };
2818  DOMPurify.removeHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
2819    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
2820      return undefined;
2821    }
2822    if (hookFunction !== undefined) {
2823      const index = arrayLastIndexOf(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
2824      return index === -1 ? undefined : arraySplice(hooks[entryPoint], index, 1)[0];
2825    }
2826    return arrayPop(hooks[entryPoint]);
2827  };
2828  DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint) {
2829    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
2830      return;
2831    }
2832    hooks[entryPoint] = [];
2833  };
2834  DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {
2835    hooks = _createHooksMap();
2836  };
2837  return DOMPurify;
2838}
2839var purify = createDOMPurify();
2840

2841// src/browser.ts
2842var browser_default = purify;
2843purify.sanitize.bind(purify);
2844purify.isSupported;
2845purify.addHook.bind(purify);
2846purify.removeHook.bind(purify);
2847purify.removeHooks.bind(purify);
2848purify.removeAllHooks.bind(purify);
2849purify.setConfig.bind(purify);
2850purify.clearConfig.bind(purify);
2851purify.isValidAttribute.bind(purify);
2852purify.version;
2853purify.removed;
2854
2855const UC_INIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 1e4;
2856const [isInitialized, setIsInitialized] = createSignal(false);
2857const [consentDetails, setConsentDetails] = createSignal();
2858const [needsRefresh, setNeedsRefresh] = createSignal(false);
2859const consentStore = {
2860  consentDetails,
2861  needsRefresh
2862};
2863const changeHandlers = [];
2864function onConsentChange(handler) {
2865  changeHandlers.push(handler);
2866  return () => {
2867    const index = changeHandlers.indexOf(handler);
2868    if (index >= 0) changeHandlers.splice(index, 1);
2869  };
2870}
2871function notifySubscribers(details) {
2872  for (const handler of changeHandlers) {
2873    try {
2874      handler(details);
2875    } catch (error) {
2876      logger.error("[Consent] Subscriber threw:", error);
2877    }
2878  }
2879}
2880let listenersBound = false;
2881const pendingReadyCallbacks = [];
2882const activeTimeouts = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
2883const flushReadyCallbacks = () => {
2884  if (!isInitialized()) return;
2885  const callbacks = pendingReadyCallbacks.splice(0, pendingReadyCallbacks.length);
2886  for (const callback of callbacks) {
2887    try {
2888      callback();
2889    } catch (error) {
2890      logger.error("[Consent] Ready callback threw:", error);
2891    }
2892  }
2893};
2894const handleInitialized = () => {
2895  logger.consent("Usercentrics initialized");
2896  setIsInitialized(true);
2897  flushReadyCallbacks();
2898};
2899const handleConsentChange = (event) => {
2900  const detail = event.detail;
2901  logger.consent("Consent changed", {
2902    status: detail.consent.status,
2903    updatedBy: detail.consent.updatedBy
2904  });
2905  setConsentDetails(detail);
2906  notifySubscribers(detail);
2907};
2908const loadInitialConsentDetails = async () => {
2909  if (!window.__ucCmp) return;
2910  try {
2911    const initialized = await window.__ucCmp.isInitialized();
2912    if (!initialized) return;
2913    logger.consent("Usercentrics already initialized");
2914    setIsInitialized(true);
2915    flushReadyCallbacks();
2916    const details = await window.__ucCmp.getConsentDetails();
2917    logger.consent("Initial consent details loaded", {
2918      status: details.consent.status
2919    });
2920    setConsentDetails(details);
2921    notifySubscribers(details);
2922  } catch (error) {
2923    logger.error("Failed to load initial consent details", error);
2924  }
2925};

2926const initConsentStore = () => {
2927  if (listenersBound) return;
2928  listenersBound = true;
2929  window.addEventListener("UC_UI_INITIALIZED", handleInitialized);
2930  window.addEventListener("UC_CONSENT", handleConsentChange);
2931  loadInitialConsentDetails();
2932};
2933const disposeConsentStore = () => {
2934  if (!listenersBound) return;
2935  activeTimeouts.forEach((t) => clearTimeout(t));
2936  activeTimeouts.clear();
2937  window.removeEventListener("UC_UI_INITIALIZED", handleInitialized);
2938  window.removeEventListener("UC_CONSENT", handleConsentChange);
2939  listenersBound = false;
2940  pendingReadyCallbacks.splice(0, pendingReadyCallbacks.length);
2941  changeHandlers.splice(0, changeHandlers.length);
2942  setIsInitialized(false);
2943};
2944const whenReady = async (callback) => {
2945  initConsentStore();
2946  if (isInitialized()) {
2947    return callback();
2948  }
2949  return new Promise((resolve) => {
2950    const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
2951      activeTimeouts.delete(timeout);
2952      logger.warn("Usercentrics initialization timed out");
2953      resolve(void 0);
2954    }, UC_INIT_TIMEOUT_MS);
2955    activeTimeouts.add(timeout);
2956    pendingReadyCallbacks.push(() => {
2957      activeTimeouts.delete(timeout);
2958      clearTimeout(timeout);
2959      resolve(callback());
2960    });
2961  });
2962};
2963const consentActions = {
2964  showConsentBanner: () => {
2965    logger.consent("Opening consent banner");
2966    return whenReady(() => window.__ucCmp?.showFirstLayer());
2967  },
2968  showConsentSettings: () => {
2969    logger.consent("Opening consent settings");
2970    return whenReady(() => window.__ucCmp?.showSecondLayer());
2971  },
2972  acceptAll: () => {
2973    logger.consent("Accepting all consents");
2974    return whenReady(() => window.__ucCmp?.acceptAllConsents());
2975  },
2976  denyAll: () => {
2977    logger.consent("Denying all consents");
2978    return whenReady(() => window.__ucCmp?.denyAllConsents());
2979  },
2980  updateServices: (consents) => {
2981    logger.consent("Updating service consents", {
2982      count: consents.length
2983    });
2984    return whenReady(() => window.__ucCmp?.updateServicesConsents(consents));
2985  },
2986  updateCategories: (consents) => {
2987    logger.consent("Updating category consents", {
2988      count: consents.length
2989    });
2990    return whenReady(() => window.__ucCmp?.updateCategoriesConsents(consents));
2991  },
2992  saveConsents: () => {
2993    logger.consent("Saving consents");
2994    return whenReady(() => window.__ucCmp?.saveConsents());
2995  },
2996  refreshScripts: () => {
2997    logger.consent("Refreshing scripts");
2998    return whenReady(() => window.__ucCmp?.refreshScripts());
2999  },
3000  markNeedsRefresh: () => {
3001    logger.consent("Marking page as needing refresh");
3002    setNeedsRefresh(true);
3003  },
3004  resetNeedsRefresh: () => {
3005    logger.consent("Resetting needs refresh flag");
3006    setNeedsRefresh(false);
3007  },
3008  refreshPage: () => {
3009    {
3010      logger.consent("Refreshing page");
3011      window.location.reload();
3012    }
3013  }
3014};
3015
3016const UC_SERVICE_TO_EMBED_PLATFORM = {
3017  "BJz7qNsdj-7": "youtube",
3018  // "YouTube Video"
3019  ko1w5PpFl: "facebook"
3020  // "Facebook Pixel"
3021  // NOTE: The following platforms need Usercentrics service IDs before per-platform
3022  // consent can work. Find them in the UC admin panel â Service Settings â Details,
3023  // or via `window.__ucCmp.getConsentDetails()` â services â [id] in the browser console.
3024  // Until mapped, these platforms fall back to the ALL_ACCEPTED check in syncEmbedConsent(),
3025  // meaning embeds only load when the user accepts ALL services via the UC banner.
3026  // Granular per-platform consent (via the embed overlay buttons) will not persist for these.
3027  //
3028  // "SERVICE_ID": "instagram",
3029  // "SERVICE_ID": "linkedin",
3030  // "SERVICE_ID": "x",
3031  // "SERVICE_ID": "tiktok",
3032  // "SERVICE_ID": "spotify",
3033};
3034const ALL_EMBED_PLATFORMS = ["youtube", "facebook", "instagram", "x", "tiktok", "spotify", "linkedin"];
3035const EMBED_PLATFORM_TO_UC_SERVICE = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(UC_SERVICE_TO_EMBED_PLATFORM).map(([ucId, platform]) => [platform, ucId]));
3036function hasEmbedConsent(platform) {
3037  const details = consentStore.consentDetails();
3038  if (!details) return false;
3039  const allAccepted = details.consent.status === "ALL_ACCEPTED";
3040  const serviceId = EMBED_PLATFORM_TO_UC_SERVICE[platform];
3041  const service = serviceId ? details.services[serviceId] : void 0;
3042  if (allAccepted && !service) return true;
3043  return service?.consent?.given ?? false;
3044}
3045async function giveEmbedConsent(platform) {
3046  const serviceId = EMBED_PLATFORM_TO_UC_SERVICE[platform];
3047  if (!serviceId) {
3048    logger.warn(`[EmbedConsent] No UC service ID mapped for ${platform} â consent will not persist across sessions`);
3049    return;
3050  }
3051  const details = consentStore.consentDetails();

3052  if (!details) {
3053    logger.warn(`[EmbedConsent] UC not initialized yet for ${platform} â consent will not persist`);
3054    return;
3055  }
3056  const service = details.services[serviceId];
3057  if (!service) {
3058    logger.warn(`[EmbedConsent] UC service ${serviceId} not found for ${platform} â consent will not persist`);
3059    return;
3060  }
3061  logger.consent(`Accepting embed consent for ${platform} (UC service ID: ${serviceId})`);
3062  await consentActions.updateServices([{
3063    id: serviceId,
3064    consent: true
3065  }]);
3066  await consentActions.saveConsents();
3067}
3068function initEmbedConsentSync(dom) {
3069  function syncEmbedConsent(details) {
3070    const allAccepted = details.consent.status === "ALL_ACCEPTED";
3071    for (const platform of ALL_EMBED_PLATFORMS) {
3072      const serviceId = EMBED_PLATFORM_TO_UC_SERVICE[platform];
3073      const service = serviceId ? details.services[serviceId] : void 0;
3074      if (allAccepted && !service) {
3075        dom.load(platform);
3076        continue;
3077      }
3078      if (!service?.consent) continue;
3079      if (service.consent.given) {
3080        dom.load(platform);
3081      } else {
3082        dom.revoke(platform);
3083      }
3084    }
3085  }
3086  return onConsentChange(syncEmbedConsent);
3087}
3088
3089export { ArrowIcon as A, consentStore as a, initEmbedConsentSync as b, consentActions as c, disposeConsentStore as d, resolveOgImage as e, resolveMedia as f, browser_default as g, giveEmbedConsent as h, initConsentStore as i, hasEmbedConsent as j, appendParamsToMediaUrl as k, formatTime as l, hasFiniteDuration as m, onConsentChange as o, resolveMediaUrl as r };
3090//# sourceMappingURL=embedConsentSync-D36RIyVL.js.map

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