1/** 2 * For jQuery versions less than 3.5.0, this replaces the jQuery.htmlPrefilter() 3 * function with one that fixes these security vulnerabilities while also 4 * retaining the pre-3.5.0 behavior where it's safe to do so. 5 * - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11022 6 * - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11023 7 * 8 * Additionally, for jQuery versions that do not have a jQuery.htmlPrefilter() 9 * function (1.x prior to 1.12 and 2.x prior to 2.2), this adds it, and 10 * extends the functions that need to call it to do so. 11 * 12 * Drupal core's jQuery version is 1.4.4, but jQuery Update can provide a 13 * different version, so this covers all versions between 1.4.4 and 3.4.1. 14 * The GitHub links in the code comments below link to jQuery 1.5 code, because 15 * 1.4.4 isn't on GitHub, but the referenced code didn't change from 1.4.4 to 16 * 1.5. 17 */ 18 19(function (jQuery) { 20 21 // Parts of this backport differ by jQuery version. 22 var versionParts = jQuery.fn.jquery.split('.'); 23 var majorVersion = parseInt(versionParts[0]); 24 var minorVersion = parseInt(versionParts[1]); 25 26 // No backport is needed if we're already on jQuery 3.5 or higher. 27 if ( (majorVersion > 3) || (majorVersion === 3 && minorVersion >= 5) ) { 28 return; 29 } 30 31 // Prior to jQuery 3.5, jQuery converted XHTML-style self-closing tags to 32 // their XML equivalent: e.g., "<div />" to "<div></div>". This is 33 // problematic for several reasons, including that it's vulnerable to XSS 34 // attacks. However, since this was jQuery's behavior for many years, many 35 // Drupal modules and jQuery plugins may be relying on it. Therefore, we 36 // preserve that behavior, but for a limited set of tags only, that we believe 37 // to not be vulnerable. This is the set of HTML tags that satisfy all of the 38 // following conditions: 39 // - In DOMPurify's list of HTML tags. If an HTML tag isn't safe enough to 40 // appear in that list, then we don't want to mess with it here either. 41 // @see https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/2.0.11/dist/purify.js#L128 42 // - A normal element (not a void, template, text, or foreign element). 43 // @see https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/syntax.html#elements-2 44 // - An element that is still defined by the current HTML specification 45 // (not a deprecated element), because we do not want to rely on how 46 // browsers parse deprecated elements. 47 // @see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Element 48 // - Not 'html', 'head', or 'body', because this pseudo-XHTML expansion is 49 // designed for fragments, not entire documents. 50 // - Not 'colgroup', because due to an idiosyncrasy of jQuery's original 51 // regular expression, it didn't match on colgroup, and we don't want to 52 // introduce a behavior change for that. 53 var selfClosingTagsToReplace = [ 54 'a', 'abbr', 'address', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 55 'blockquote', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'cite', 'code', 'data', 56 'datalist', 'dd', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'em', 57 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 58 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'header', 'hgroup', 'i', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 59 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'menu', 'meter', 'nav', 'ol', 'optgroup', 60 'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 61 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'section', 'select', 'small', 'source', 'span', 62 'strong', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'tfoot', 'th', 63 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video' 64 ]; 65 66 // Define regular expressions for <TAG/> and <TAG ATTRIBUTES/>. Doing this as 67 // two expressions makes it easier to target <a/> without also targeting 68 // every tag that starts with "a". 69 var xhtmlRegExpGroup = '(' + selfClosingTagsToReplace.join('|') + ')'; 70 var whitespace = '[\\x20\\t\\r\\n\\f]'; 71 var rxhtmlTagWithoutSpaceOrAttributes = new RegExp('<' + xhtmlRegExpGroup + '\\/>', 'gi'); 72 var rxhtmlTagWithSpaceAndMaybeAttributes = new RegExp('<' + xhtmlRegExpGroup + '(' + whitespace + '[^>]*)\\/>', 'gi'); 73 74 // jQuery 3.5 also fixed a vulnerability for when </select> appears within 75 // an <option> or <optgroup>, but it did that in local code that we can't 76 // backport directly. Instead, we filter such cases out. To do so, we need to 77 // determine when jQuery would otherwise invoke the vulnerable code, which it 78 // uses this regular expression to determine. The regular expression changed 79 // for version 3.0.0 and changed again for 3.4.0. 80 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L4958 81 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/3.0.0/dist/jquery.js#L4584 82 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/3.4.0/dist/jquery.js#L4712 83 var rtagName; 84 if (majorVersion < 3) { 85 rtagName = /<([\w:]+)/; 86 } 87 else if (minorVersion < 4) { 88 rtagName = /<([a-z][^\/\0>\x20\t\r\n\f]+)/i; 89 } 90 else { 91 rtagName = /<([a-z][^\/\0>\x20\t\r\n\f]*)/i; 92 } 93 94 // The regular expression that jQuery uses to determine which self-closing 95 // tags to expand to open and close tags. This is vulnerable, because it 96 // matches all tag names except the few excluded ones. We only use this 97 // expression for determining vulnerability. The expression changed for 98 // version 3, but we only need to check for vulnerability in versions 1 and 2, 99 // so we use the expression from those versions. 100 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L4957 101 var rxhtmlTag = /<(?!area|br|col|embed|hr|img|input|link|meta|param)(([\w:]+)[^>]*)\/>/gi; 102 103 jQuery.extend({ 104 htmlPrefilter: function (html) { 105 // This is how jQuery determines the first tag in the HTML. 106 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L5521 107 var tag = ( rtagName.exec( html ) || [ "", "" ] )[ 1 ].toLowerCase(); 108
109 // It is not valid HTML for <option> or <optgroup> to have <select> as 110 // either a descendant or sibling, and attempts to inject one can cause 111 // XSS on jQuery versions before 3.5. Since this is invalid HTML and a 112 // possible XSS attack, reject the entire string. 113 // @see https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11023 114 if ((tag === 'option' || tag === 'optgroup') && html.match(/<\/?select/i)) { 115 html = ''; 116 } 117 118 // Retain jQuery's prior to 3.5 conversion of pseudo-XHTML, but for only 119 // the tags in the `selfClosingTagsToReplace` list defined above. 120 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L5518 121 // @see https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11022 122 html = html.replace(rxhtmlTagWithoutSpaceOrAttributes, "<$1></$1>"); 123 html = html.replace(rxhtmlTagWithSpaceAndMaybeAttributes, "<$1$2></$1>"); 124 125 // Prior to jQuery 1.12 and 2.2, this function gets called (via code later 126 // in this file) in addition to, rather than instead of, the unsafe 127 // expansion of self-closing tags (including ones not in the list above). 128 // We can't prevent that unsafe expansion from running, so instead we 129 // check to make sure that it doesn't affect the DOM returned by the 130 // browser's parsing logic. If it does affect it, then it's vulnerable to 131 // XSS, so we reject the entire string. 132 if ( (majorVersion === 1 && minorVersion < 12) || (majorVersion === 2 && minorVersion < 2) ) { 133 var htmlRisky = html.replace(rxhtmlTag, "<$1></$2>"); 134 if (htmlRisky !== html) { 135 // Even though htmlRisky and html are different strings, they might 136 // represent the same HTML structure once parsed, in which case, 137 // htmlRisky is actually safe. We can ask the browser to parse both 138 // to find out, but the browser can't parse table fragments (e.g., a 139 // root-level "<td>"), so we need to wrap them. We just need this 140 // technique to work on all supported browsers; we don't need to 141 // copy from the specific jQuery version we're using. 142 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/3.5.1/dist/jquery.js#L4939 143 var wrapMap = { 144 thead: [ 1, "<table>", "</table>" ], 145 col: [ 2, "<table><colgroup>", "</colgroup></table>" ], 146 tr: [ 2, "<table><tbody>", "</tbody></table>" ], 147 td: [ 3, "<table><tbody><tr>", "</tr></tbody></table>" ], 148 }; 149 wrapMap.tbody = wrapMap.tfoot = wrapMap.colgroup = wrapMap.caption = wrapMap.thead; 150 wrapMap.th = wrapMap.td; 151 152 // Function to wrap HTML into something that a browser can parse. 153 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/3.5.1/dist/jquery.js#L5032 154 var getWrappedHtml = function (html) { 155 var wrap = wrapMap[tag]; 156 if (wrap) { 157 html = wrap[1] + html + wrap[2]; 158 } 159 return html; 160 }; 161 162 // Function to return canonical HTML after parsing it. This parses 163 // only; it doesn't execute scripts. 164 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery-migrate/blob/3.3.0/src/jquery/manipulation.js#L5 165 var getParsedHtml = function (html) { 166 var doc = window.document.implementation.createHTMLDocument( "" ); 167 doc.body.innerHTML = html; 168 return doc.body ? doc.body.innerHTML : ''; 169 }; 170 171 // If the browser couldn't parse either one successfully, or if 172 // htmlRisky parses differently than html, then html is vulnerable, 173 // so reject it. 174 var htmlParsed = getParsedHtml(getWrappedHtml(html)); 175 var htmlRiskyParsed = getParsedHtml(getWrappedHtml(htmlRisky)); 176 if (htmlRiskyParsed === '' || htmlParsed === '' || (htmlRiskyParsed !== htmlParsed)) { 177 html = ''; 178 } 179 } 180 } 181 182 return html; 183 } 184 }); 185 186 // Prior to jQuery 1.12 and 2.2, jQuery.clean(), jQuery.buildFragment(), and 187 // jQuery.fn.html() did not call jQuery.htmlPrefilter(), so we add that. 188 if ( (majorVersion === 1 && minorVersion < 12) || (majorVersion === 2 && minorVersion < 2) ) { 189 // Filter the HTML coming into jQuery.fn.html(). 190 var fnOriginalHtml = jQuery.fn.html; 191 jQuery.fn.extend({ 192 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L5147 193 html: function (value) { 194 if (typeof value === "string") { 195 value = jQuery.htmlPrefilter(value); 196 } 197 // .html() can be called as a setter (with an argument) or as a getter 198 // (without an argument), so invoke fnOriginalHtml() the same way that 199 // we were invoked. 200 return fnOriginalHtml.apply(this, arguments.length ? [value] : []); 201 } 202 }); 203 204 // The regular expression that jQuery uses to determine if a string is HTML. 205 // Used by both clean() and buildFragment(). 206 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L4960
207 var rhtml = /<|&#?\w+;/; 208 209 // Filter HTML coming into: 210 // - jQuery.clean() for versions prior to 1.9. 211 // - jQuery.buildFragment() for 1.9 and above. 212 // 213 // The looping constructs in the two functions might be essentially 214 // identical, but they're each expressed here in the way that most closely 215 // matches their original expression in jQuery, so that we filter all of 216 // the items and only the items that jQuery will treat as HTML strings. 217 if (majorVersion === 1 && minorVersion < 9) { 218 var originalClean = jQuery.clean; 219 jQuery.extend({ 220 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L5493 221 'clean': function (elems, context, fragment, scripts) { 222 for ( var i = 0, elem; (elem = elems[i]) != null; i++ ) { 223 if ( typeof elem === "string" && rhtml.test( elem ) ) { 224 elems[i] = elem = jQuery.htmlPrefilter(elem); 225 } 226 } 227 return originalClean.call(this, elems, context, fragment, scripts); 228 } 229 }); 230 } 231 else { 232 var originalBuildFragment = jQuery.buildFragment; 233 jQuery.extend({ 234 // @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.9.0/jquery.js#L6419 235 'buildFragment': function (elems, context, scripts, selection) { 236 var l = elems.length; 237 for ( var i = 0; i < l; i++ ) { 238 var elem = elems[i]; 239 if (elem || elem === 0) { 240 if ( jQuery.type( elem ) !== "object" && rhtml.test( elem ) ) { 241 elems[i] = elem = jQuery.htmlPrefilter(elem); 242 } 243 } 244 } 245 return originalBuildFragment.call(this, elems, context, scripts, selection); 246 } 247 }); 248 } 249 } 250 251})(jQuery);
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