https://satellize.com/assets/1.2.7-2CG-fK3Y.js

1const e="1.2.7",t="Election Communications Infrastructure",n="live",i="Providing tamper-resistant, sovereign-controlled satellite communications links for electoral management bodies, polling stations and results transmission during national elections.",o=`Elections are the single highest-stakes communications event a state conducts, yet most countries run them over commercial mobile networks, rented VSAT capacity or public internet that they do not control. A disrupted or manipulated results transmission is not a technical embarrassment — it is a constitutional crisis. Foreign commercial operators, whose licensing agreements sit under another country's jurisdiction, can be pressured to delay, degrade or disclose traffic at precisely the moment when doing so has maximum political leverage.
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3A sovereign LEO satellite layer changes the threat model entirely. A constellation of small satellites with encrypted bent-pipe or regenerative payloads provides direct links from every polling district to the national electoral commission's tally centre, bypassing terrestrial infrastructure that may be compromised, overloaded or geographically unreachable. Because the state owns the keys, the ground segment and the orbital slots, there is no third-party chokepoint an adversary can squeeze. Onboard link encryption with hardware security modules under national custody means that even if a terminal is seized, the upstream network remains intact.
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5Operationally, the same constellation serves the full electoral cycle: voter-roll synchronisation in the weeks before polling, secure voice and data for roving election observers during the count, and a verified, timestamped results feed to the commission the moment each station closes. In the 72 hours when a nation is most politically fragile, the government holds the communications pipe and can prove it.`,a=["Results transmission integrity is a constitutional requirement — a single credibly-disputed tally feed can trigger a legitimacy crisis that no recount fixes.","Commercial VSAT and mobile backhaul operators are legally compelled to comply with intercept orders from their own licensing governments, not yours.","Remote and island polling stations frequently have no terrestrial fallback; satellite is the only physically viable last-mile path on election day.","End-to-end encryption keyed under national authority is the only way to guarantee chain-of-custody evidence for any post-election legal challenge."],r=[{title:"ITU — Telecommunications and Election Administration",url:"https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Pages/default.aspx",snippet:"The ITU's development sector has advised member states on deploying sovereign telecommunications capacity for electoral management, noting that reliance on foreign-licensed carriers introduces unacceptable regulatory and geopolitical dependencies."},{title:"UNODC — Cybercrime and Electoral Integrity",url:"https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cybercrime/index.html",snippet:"UNODC identifies interception and manipulation of results-transmission networks as an emerging vector for electoral interference, and recommends end-to-end encrypted, state-controlled communications as a mitigation."},{title:"European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) — Elections Security Guidelines",url:"https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/election-guidelines",snippet:"ENISA's election security guidelines classify the results-transmission channel as critical national infrastructure and advise member states to maintain sovereign control over network paths used during counting and reporting."},{title:"African Union — Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa",url:"https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance",snippet:"The AU Charter on Democracy commits signatory states to ensuring the technical integrity of electoral processes, an obligation that cannot be met when core communications infrastructure is owned and licensed by foreign commercial entities."}],s={score:9,summary:"A state that cannot guarantee the integrity of its own election communications cannot guarantee the legitimacy of its own government.",reasons:["Foreign-lice

5nsed commercial VSAT and mobile operators are subject to intercept and suspension orders from their home governments, creating a direct foreign-interference pathway at the most politically sensitive moment in the electoral cycle.","Post-election legal challenges demand a provable, unbroken chain of custody for every results transmission; only a nationally keyed, nationally operated link can supply that evidence without relying on a commercial provider's cooperation.","Terrestrial infrastructure — fibre, microwave, mobile — is routinely targeted for physical disruption or traffic manipulation during disputed elections; a sovereign orbital layer removes that chokepoint entirely.","Export-controlled encryption hardware and commercial satellite capacity can be withheld or downgraded by supplier governments as a coercive tool during politically sensitive periods, making supply-chain sovereignty a precondition of operational independence."]},l={payload:"S-band regenerative bent-pipe transponder, 50 Mbps aggregate throughput per satellite, hardware security module for onboard AES-256 key enforcement; secondary VHF channel for low-rate observer voice as fallback",busClass:"6U cubesat bus, 12 kg, 40 W payload power; passive thermal management; radiation-tolerant COTS processor with ECC memory for onboard packet routing",orbit:"Sun-synchronous LEO at 550 km, 18-satellite walker constellation at 53° inclination for national-scale coverage, median revisit under 30 minutes, continuous contact achievable with two ground stations for equatorial and mid-latitude states",groundSegment:"Two national hub earth stations (S-band uplink/downlink, TT&C); national electoral commission tally centre as primary data sink; encrypted VPN tunnel over ground fibre between hubs; SatNOGS-compatible UHF backup for telemetry only",dataPipeline:"Polling-station terminal → encrypted uplink → onboard router → downlink to tally hub → national HSM decrypt → results database → cryptographic hash published to national public ledger within 60 seconds of receipt",endUserDelivery:"Web dashboard for electoral commission officials with per-station transmission status, latency and integrity flags; read-only observer portal with verified aggregate results; SMS alert to returning officers on link failure or integrity anomaly",timeToLaunch:"First 6-satellite demonstrator constellation operational in 20 months from contract, covering national territory; full 18-satellite constellation before the subsequent election cycle at 36 months",caveats:"S-band spectrum coordination with ITU must begin at contract signature to guarantee orbital slots before launch; encryption payload components sourced from domestic or allied suppliers only — US ITAR-controlled parts require export licence that may not be granted for all partner states, so European (e.g. Thales, Telespazio) or Indian (ISRO commercial arm) primes are recommended"},c={number:e,title:t,maturity:n,shortDescription:i,longDescription:o,whatMatters:a,references:r,sovereignty:s,architecture:l};export{l as architecture,c as default,o as longDescription,n as maturity,e as number,r as references,i as shortDescription,s as sovereignty,t as title,a as whatMatters};